After (May 10, 2024)
I am just off the plane after a week in the Middle East. (Hence the later-than-usual arrival of this newsletter in your in-box.) I visited two Arab countries (Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates) as well as Israel. I had the chance to meet and talk to a wide selection of political and business leaders, journalists, academics, and, most importantly, taxi drivers. So I thought I would share some of what I heard and concluded.
I am well aware of the news, much of which is negative, but I want to begin with a piece of everyday life that is positive. It was in Abu Dhabi, at the airport. After all these years of Israel being a pariah in the region, it was hard not to be struck by the sheer normalcy of seeing the signs and hearing the announcements for the flight to Tel Aviv. It was not all that long ago such things were unimaginable. Change—make that positive change—is possible, even in the Middle East.
Two aspects of life in today’s Israel remind me of the United States. The first is how divided the country has become. To be sure, there are reminders everywhere of the hostages – when you arrive at Ben Gurion Airport you are greeted by photographs of the hostages with the words “Bring Him (or Her) Home”— but even when it comes to the hostages there is no consensus on how their fate ought to be balanced against prosecuting the war against Hamas.
Second, much of the division revolves around perceptions of the prime minister, Benjamin (or Bibi as he is known to all) Netanyahu. He is no less central to the conversation over dinners and coffee shops in Israel than is Donald Trump here in the United States. Bibi is revered by his supporters and reviled by his critics, who are no less vitriolic than Trump’s in maintaining Netanyahu and his ultra-conservative allies are a threat to Israeli democracy and to Israel itself. Middle ground is rare.
A few issues dominated the news during my visit. One was the on-again, off-again talks over ceasefires, hostage returns and prisoner releases. It has become clear that the Israeli government has made pursuit of the war against Hamas a higher priority than gaining the release of the hostages, a reality underscored by the prime minister’s decision not to hold off launching the initial phase of the attack on Rafah.
Hamas has also done its part to make reaching a hostage and ceasefire deal less likely by attacking Israeli soldiers near Kerem Shalom (one of the entry points into Gaza) and by demanding a permanent ceasefire, something it knows Israel will not yet agree to. My guess is the best chance for a long-term ceasefire and a full hostage return will come after the Israelis do whatever it is they do in Rafah.
Arms and the Man
A second big story is the Biden decision to hold off sending select arms (essentially large bombs that inevitably cause damage and casualties in an area beyond the immediate target) and its readiness to hold off sending selected additional military items if Israel goes ahead with a large-scale assault on Rafah. It is, however, not an embargo as some claim. The idea that Israel is being abandoned or left to stand alone is preposterous. 99 percent of U.S. military aid (that totals close to $4 billion annually) will continue to flow. The United States and Israel cooperated closely several weeks ago in neutralizing hundreds of missiles and drones launched by Iran and would do so again if need be. The United States also just joined Israel in opposing a UN General Assembly resolution advocating Palestinian statehood, arguing such matters are best resolved through direct negotiations. I see the Biden arms decision as an example of the United States acting independently on behalf of its own interests and preferences, much as it did in air-dropping food aid and building a pier off Gaza or in abstaining on a UN resolution Israel wanted vetoed.
I know that many critics are slamming the arms decision as motivated by voters in Michigan or by campus protests. I am not going to argue politics didn’t enter it, but I truly believe the Biden administration has concluded Israel is wrong (both militarily and morally) in how it has been fighting the war and in the belief it can eliminate Hamas. The Biden administration also disagrees with Israeli policies regarding settlements and the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Most of all the president and those around him think Israel lacks a viable strategy for what would come after the war on Hamas—and without such a strategy it cannot succeed.
That said, the arms decision is already being seized on by the Israeli government and its backers in both countries as a sign of American perfidy. I can see Biden being scapegoated as the reason Hamas was not eliminated even though that was never in the cards. What is more, holding back delivery of some large bombs does not prevent Israel from going after Hamas in a more targeted manner. The announcement will also be blamed for undermining the ceasefire and hostage talks even though it had become apparent they were going nowhere.
My sense is that the Israeli government was surprised by the decision—not that they hadn’t heard rumors it was being considered, but that the Biden administration actually went ahead with it after seven months of disagreeing with much of Israeli policy but then not acting. As I wrote some weeks back, this entire crisis has opened up the largest rift in U.S.-Israeli relations in decades and possibly since 1956.
After Rafah
I want to turn to the central question, namely, what comes after Rafah? I continue to believe Israel would be wise to introduce a political initiative alongside its military action; it needs to marginalize Hamas as much as degrade it, and while the latter is a military task, the former a political one, and can only be accomplished by articulating a pathway by which Palestinians can achieve more through peaceful coexistence, diplomacy and compromise than by terrorism. Instead, the government has decided on what best can be described as a sequential policy: defeat Hamas, then think about what comes after. This stance is motivated both by politics – it is not clear the ruling coalition could survive any move in the direction of satisfying Palestinian nationalism that could lead to any sort of second state – and by a widely-held skepticism that Palestinians could ever make for good neighbors.
This issue could well move to center stage in a matter of weeks, i.e., once the Rafah operation is declared over. The Israeli government doesn’t want to see Hamas revive and become the Hezbollah of Gaza, opposes bringing in what it views as a corrupt and ineffectual Palestinian Authority, and wants to avoid a prolonged Israeli occupation that would prove costly and controversial. It would like there to be a multinational Arab force of some sort to take over the task of providing security in Gaza, which among other things is essential if rebuilding is to happen.
Any such force faces two hurdles. One is military. No amount of Israeli military action in Rafah will destroy or eliminate Hamas. A security force in Gaza would face a demanding environment. Hamas would likely resist, turning the mission more into one of peacemaking than peacekeeping. There would be casualties. Determining rules of engagement would be difficult. Success would require a long-term commitment of capable forces from several Arab countries. It would also need a sizable Palestinian component to lend it legitimacy.
But a military force will require political cover. It cannot be seen or made to be seen as the handmaiden of Israel. This can only be achieved if the Israeli government is much more forthcoming on Palestinian political aspirations than it is prepared to be. The same reluctance stands in the way of the Saudis agreeing to normalize ties with Israel, although what exactly the Saudis (who care more about getting a security pact and nuclear assistance from the United States than they do about the Palestinians) will require from Israel remains to be seen.
Let me just say here that there is considerable interest in both the Arab world and in Israel for all this to come together. Many Arab governments and Israel share a hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood and offshoots such as Hamas, fear of Iran, and concern over American reliability or what they see as the lack of it. There is a major opportunity to be seized if Israel is prepared to meet responsible Palestinians halfway, something which has the added advantage of preserving Israel as a democratic, Jewish state that enjoys strong ties with the United States.
Many in the United States and Israel believe the only way of getting from here to there is through a change in Israeli policy resulting from a change of government following new elections. I find this scenario doubtful. Prominent military members of the government such as Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot are critical of the prime minister but are more supportive than not of the military campaign against Hamas and in any event are reluctant to leave the government a time of crisis. It is also not clear whether others would leave with them.
And even if the government somehow came down, I came away thinking it would be wrong to assume new elections would translate into new leadership. Imagine that there is a several week campaign in Rafah, after which Israel says it is ready to accept an open-ended ceasefire in exchange for a full hostage return. Imagine too there is normalization with Saudi Arabia and some sort of Arab force in Gaza. There could even be a deal with Hezbollah that would allow Israelis to return to their homes in the north. All of which would likely lead to a Netanyahu victory. A longshot maybe, but not inconceivable.
Actually, a lot comes down to Netanyahu and whether he is willing and able to put enough on the table politically to bring the Saudis and the other Arab governments on board along with some Palestinians. Don’t expect any Nixon going to China conversion, but I can see him embracing some sort of Palestinian state minus (along the lines of the January 2020 Trump plan) as a basis for entering a negotiation. (Just to be clear, there is no way that one-sided plan would ever be acceptable to Palestinians as the basis for an agreement, but it could allow the start of a process.) Israelis in the aftermath of October 7 are in no mood to accept Palestinian statehood, but they may be open to reaching out to a new generation of Palestinians and Arab governments and signing up to a process that over time could bring about an entity with some but not all features of a state (among other things it would have to accept strict limits on arms and on military ties to third parties) if the package also promised Israel security in Gaza and full relations with Saudi Arabia. What is certain is that the United States would have to be prepared to play a large role in making the case for such a process and in shaping it if something were ever to gain traction.
Rights and Wrongs on Campus
It should come as little surprise that someone who has spent as much time in and working on the Middle East as I have would be paying attention to the campus protests. But I am also interested because of a second hat, that of the author of a book (The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens) that argues American democracy will only survive if we do a much better job of balancing individual rights with obligations both to one another and to the country.
For the most part those involved in the protests have failed to do this. To be fair, they have got one obligation right, to get involved. In principle this is a good thing as democracy requires participation on the part of its citizens.
But political involvement, as important as it is, is not the only obligation central to democracy. More important, it is not the first. That distinction belongs to getting informed. And there many of the protesters have come up short.
I don’t just mean the anecdotal reports that some chanting from the river to the sea could name neither body of water. (In case any are reading this, it is the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.) But there are much bigger gaps. Based on what they are saying, there is little appreciation of the relevant history and its complexities, of the many opportunities for a state of their own missed by Palestinians, of the myriad failures of Hamas, a group able to build tunnels and kill and capture civilians but not maintain a functioning economy or a modern society that in any way protected the rights of its people.
Israeli policy before and after October 7 deserves our criticism, but it in no way justifies either letting Hamas off the hook (much less supporting it) or support for outcomes that do not provide for a Jewish state.
Again, being informed, as Jefferson pointed out, is central to what is expected of citizens in a democracy. That is the only way they can vote wisely and hold those with power to account.
The protesters also fail to meet four of the other obligations central to a democracy and the book I happened to write about it.
Citizens must remain open to compromise. The path to progress in the Middle East lies not in taking away the rights or security of Israelis but in finding a way to promote the Palestinian rights and security at the same time. That will require compromise from both sides.
Civility too is essential. To treat others with respect. To hear them out. Being civil is not just the right thing to do but the smart thing as well. It preserves the possibility of compromise and the potential to work together on other issues even if compromise on the issue at hand proves elusive.
Non-violence is likewise essential. Those who act violently against persons or property do not advance their cause but discredit it. Actually, they make me question what their cause is as it gets lost amidst behavior that takes center stage and diminishes the ability to contend with the issues.
Last but not least is the obligation to protect the common good, to protect your rights in a manner that also protects those of others. In this case, it means balancing the right of free speech with the free speech of those who disagree…not to mention their right to attend classes, enjoy commencement, and go about their lives without intimidation.
All of which leads me to circle back to where I began, to getting involved. So, yes, those who disagree with U.S. policy in the Middle East can protest, but in a responsible manner. They should at the same time double down on reading about the region and its history. They could take relevant courses and invite to campus speakers representing a range of perspectives. They might even consider making a professional commitment to joining the Foreign Service or the intelligence community or becoming an academic or working with an NGO providing needed services to people in the region. Here as elsewhere, it would be a pity to allow a crisis to go to waste.
As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.
Richard Haass in the news
'It's Definitely an Earthquake': A Top U.S. Expert on Biden, Bibi and the Arms Embargo Bombshell (Haaretz)