Before the Fall (August 30, 2024)
Welcome to Home & Away, the last of the summer of 2024 (I am sad to say). I am aware that fall does not formally begin until September 22 or so, but Labor Day is the real dividing line between the seasons. Time is fast running out on that summer to-do list.
Here at Home we are now some 70 days away from November’s elections. Early voting is not far off in some states. As an aside, I accept the case for early voting, but I have qualms about really early voting, as in say more than two weeks before an election. We all decide on imperfect information, but voting when so much might still emerge or happen seems wrong.
The debate over the debate has left it unclear whether there will be a presidential debate on September 10 and, if so, under what terms. Either way, it is hard not to sense that momentum is shifting toward Vice President Harris. That said, it is way too soon to take away anything conclusive from this other than we now have a race whereas a month or so ago we did not.
One item to keep an eye on is the potential that politically motivated officials at the state level (Georgia for one) will attempt to delay or obstruct the election certification process. In late 2022, Congress and the White House shored up some of the weaknesses in the Electoral Count Act of 1877 that made it all too easy for individual members of Congress to cause mischief and slow or block the tabulation of electoral votes. But mischief can still occur, and it might prove possible for state officials motivated by partisan agendas to delay or determine the recipient of a state’s electoral votes. The 75 days between election day and inauguration should be of real concern, especially if it appears as though close votes in a few swing states will hand Harris a victory.
West Meets East
As for Away, I want to begin with China before turning to the Middle East. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan traveled to Beijing to meet with Wang Yi, the senior foreign policy advisor to Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Sullivan also met with Xi and a vice chairman of the country’s Central Military Commission, a man far more important than the defense minister whom U.S. officials usually meet. This has all come about in the aftermath of last November’s Biden-Xi meeting in San Francisco, when both leaders determined, albeit for very different reasons, that it made sense to establish a floor on what had become a relationship in something of a free fall.
Regular communication channels, especially at a strategic level such as that between Sullivan and Wang, are a good thing, less for so-called deliverables and what they might settle than for reducing the possibility of misunderstandings and communicating the intentions behind certain actions the other side might see as a threat.
Nonetheless, it is hard not to be struck by the lack of a common U.S.-China agenda. China is focused above all on Taiwan, less out of a fear that the island will pursue de jure independence and more out of concern that it is drifting out of reach by forming a separate political and cultural identity and embedding itself in a constellation of liberal democracies. It is also looking to reduce U.S. tariffs on Chinese manufactured goods and more importantly U.S. export controls on technology.
The United States, for its part, is also interested in communicating its position on Taiwan and technology, but from the opposing perspective, i.e., it wants to discourage Chinese coercion of Taiwan, signal that Beijing would pay a heavy price if it were to use force against the island, and explain its concerns with Chinese behavior that are driving the export controls. Washington also wants to discuss Chinese excess capacity in sectors such as electric vehicles and renewable energy that could have enormous ramifications for American manufacturing.
The U.S. side is trying without much success to limit Chinese support of Russia’s military, to rein in its nuclear weapons build-up (China now has the fastest growing arsenal in the world), and to stop the export of chemical precursors central to the production of fentanyl. The South China Sea is also reemerging as a dangerous potential flashpoint, as Chinese pressure on the Philippines mounts. The truth is this will remain a difficult relationship no matter who becomes the 47th president, although one big question is whether Trump would push back against China in the geopolitical sphere (and be prepared to defend Taiwan) or whether he would only concern himself with bilateral economic matters.
Up-Front
As for the Middle East, there was an Israeli preemptive attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon that for the moment does not appear to be leading to a serious conflict. And there has yet to be any Iranian retaliation for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Meanwhile the Gaza ceasefire talks remain on life support despite nonstop U.S. prodding. In the interim, Israel rescued one hostage in a tunnel network in Gaza, although as I have written before, the only way to secure the return of every remaining hostage is through a negotiated ceasefire.
What I find to be the big news from the region, though, is the situation in the West Bank, an area just over two thousand square miles that Israel has occupied ever since the June 1967 Six Day war. Almost three million Palestinians and close to half a million Israelis live there. None of these numbers takes into account Jerusalem, which has a separate, complicated, and controversial political and legal status.
The news is of armed clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants that led to the death of more than a dozen of the latter. While the focus of world attention has been on Gaza and Israel’s northern front with Lebanon and Hezbollah, the West Bank is emerging as a third front for Israel…or sixth if one also includes the Houthis in Yemen, Syria, and Iran proper.
What increasingly worries me is that I can see the West Bank going the way of Gaza. I don’t mean in the sense of October 7, but rather a version of what has happened since, an open-ended, incident-filled, costly grind. There are some troubling similarities, including the emergence of radical armed Palestinian militias, inspired by Hamas and fed up with what is widely judged to be a feckless Palestinian Authority, along with the absence of any Israeli political initiative that would offer Palestinians an attractive political future, much less a state of their own.
Then there is the growing number of settlements and settlers, increasing violence carried out by Israeli settlers on Palestinian civilians, and an Israeli security and political establishment that tends to look the other way or worse yet abet the land expropriation and violence. The Biden administration has sanctioned some of those behind the settler violence, but as I wrote in my recent Foreign Affairs article on the history of U.S. management and mismanagement of difficult relationships with friends (which several of you suggested might just as easily have appeared in Psychology Today), U.S. policy towards settlements and settlers over successive administrations has been mostly to look the other way, making U.S. talk of a two-state solution increasingly empty.
Going Nuclear
My column this month for Project Syndicate was about nuclear proliferation, but focused less on the spread of nuclear weapons. Don’t get me wrong. I worry about Iran, which has dramatically reduced the time it would require to develop one or more nuclear devices. An Iran with nuclear weapons might use them – or, even if not, might calculate that it could safely coerce or attack Israel or one or more of its Arab neighbors directly (or thorough one of its proxies) with non-nuclear, conventional weapons.
But I am increasingly worried about vertical proliferation, which refers to increases in the quality and/or quantity of the nuclear arsenals of the nine countries that already possess these weapons. The danger is not only that nuclear weapons might be used in a war but also that the possibility of war would increase by emboldening governments to act more aggressively in pursuit of geopolitical goals in the belief that they may act with impunity.
I already mentioned China’s fast-growing nuclear arsenal, which may well reflect a belief that if it can match the U.S. in this realm it can deter Washington from intervening on Taiwan’s behalf during any crisis over the island.
Then there is North Korea. Neither economic sanctions nor diplomacy has succeeded in curtailing its nuclear program, which we should expect will benefit from increased Russian assistance in the coming years. North Korea is now thought to possess more than 50 warheads. Some are on missiles with intercontinental range that have improving accuracy.
Russia offers another reason for worry. New START, the principal arms control agreement between Russia and the United States, is due to expire in February 2026. Russia might well refuse to extend the treaty, possibly because the performance of its armed forces in Ukraine has left it more dependent than ever on its nuclear arsenal. Or it may seek to barter its willingness to continue abiding by the agreement for U.S. concessions on Ukraine.
What worries Washington is not only what Russia might do but also that the U.S. now faces three adversaries with nuclear weapons who could coordinate their policies and pose a unified nuclear front in a crisis. All this is prompting Washington to rethink its own nuclear posture. As David Sanger reported for the New York Times, the U.S. government reportedly completed its periodic review of its nuclear forces and is grappling with how to adjust its posture to contend with this new reality. At a minimum, billions of dollars will be spent on a new generation of bombers, missiles, and submarines. At worst, we could be entering an era of unstructured nuclear competition.
It all adds up to a dangerous moment. The taboo associated with nuclear weapons has grown weaker since the U.S. used them twice against Japan to hasten World War II’s end. Indeed, Russian officials have hinted strongly at their readiness to use nuclear weapons in the context of the war in Ukraine.
Nuclear weapons played a stabilizing role during the Cold War. Three and a half decades after the Cold War’s end, though, a new world is emerging, one characterized by nuclear arms races, potential new entrants into an ever less exclusive nuclear-weapons club, and a long list of deep disagreements in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. This is not a situation that lends itself to a solution, but at best to effective management. One can only hope the leaders of this era will be up to the challenge.
Sorry to end on such a sober note. But like I said, summer is ending, and I find it hard to be upbeat given that I will soon be trading in my shorts for a suit.
As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.
Richard Haass in the news
China’s ‘appetite and dreams’ about Taiwan are still there (Squawk Box)
Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat (New York Times)
Articles
The Trouble With Allies (Foreign Affairs)
The Other Proliferation (Project Syndicate)