Welcome to Home & Away. The main focus in this week’s newsletter is on events half a world away, a region the U.S. government, and everybody else used to describe as the Asia-Pacific but now is called the Indo-Pacific, a change that exaggerates India’s role but is preferred by U.S officials for that very reason. In addition, there are a few things in the Middle East and here at home that I will also discuss.
Japan’s Moment
The highlight of the week in the foreign policy world was the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the United States. Japan is this country’s most important ally, a function of its democracy’s strength, economic success, growing military might, more active diplomacy, and the strategic convergence between Tokyo and Washington regarding the seriousness of the challenge that Beijing poses to both. North Korea’s emergence as a threat not just to the peninsula and regional security but to the world given its expanding nuclear and missile arsenals only adds to Japan’s willingness to take on a larger role in the security domain.
It is worth stepping back for a moment to appreciate just what has transpired in the U.S.-Japan relationship. In three-quarters of a century Japan has evolved from a wartime foe to a close partner, from authoritarianism to democracy, and from a war-ravaged country to the world’s third-largest economy. In recent decades, it has shed much of its reluctance to see itself as a normal country, instead asserting the right to pursue its strategic interests and play a leading role on the global stage. Prime Minister Kishida put it best in his address to a joint session of Congress yesterday: “We have transformed ourselves from a reticent ally, recovering from the devastation of World War II, to a strong, committed ally, looking outward to the world.” Post post-World War II Japan, like its famous cherry blossoms, is in full bloom.
Japan is now the linchpin to two vital strategic priorities. Both involve deterring or, if need be, defending against China. The most talked about involves Taiwan, whose security Japan has come to see as in many ways inextricably linked to its own security. The westernmost inhabited island of Japan, Yonaguni, is far closer to Taiwan than it is to Okinawa’s main island. If China were to absorb Taiwan and station troops on the island, Japan would find it far more difficult to defend its sovereign territory. Japan is acquiring the means to play a growing role in defending Taiwan, setting a target of nearly doubling its defense budget, acquiring counterstrike capabilities, and establishing a joint operations command. This shift has to figure increasingly into Chinese calculations as to what it might encounter if it were to use military force to take Taiwan, something that works to deter such a scenario.
In addition, Thursday’s first-ever trilateral summit that also included the president of the Philippines signals growing concern over China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, much of it aimed at Philippine interests. President Biden “reinforced the ironclad U.S. alliance commitment to the Philippines under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft—to include those of its Coast Guard— in the Pacific, including anywhere in the South China Sea.” There is little ambiguity in that statement, and thus a Chinese use of force in the area could well lead to a crisis this year. Indeed, the South China Sea is a likelier venue for a U.S.-China confrontation in the near-term than Taiwan.
Despite the U.S.-Japan alliance reaching new heights, there were three clouds hanging over the visit. One reflects Kishida’s weakened domestic position, the result of several scandals involving his political party. Although he has not been directly implicated, it is not clear whether he will be able to survive a leadership challenge that could come this September.
The second stems from the Biden administration’s refusal to approve the Japanese company Nippon Steel’s bid to acquire U.S. Steel. This has nothing to do with economics, as the deal would be good for American workers and consumers alike. Nor does it have anything to do with national security, because, as discussed above, Japan is both a good and important ally. But it has everything to do with politics. The principal union opposes the deal, although it can be argued its workers would do better with it than without it. More importantly, Donald Trump opposes the acquisition, and the White House does not want to give him an opportunity to pound the economic nationalist and populist drum at Joe Biden’s expense across several swing states. What I am hoping is that after the election, the administration will find a way to tweak the deal and approve it.
The third cloud also relates to the aforementioned Trump and reflects the unease felt by Japan (and most U.S. allies for that matter) over the prospect of his victory in November. For good reason, Japan worries about the protectionist economic policies likely to be adopted, the prospect of renewed ally-bashing, and, most of all, a new era of American unpredictability when it comes to its willingness both to stand by allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and to stand up to foes like China and North Korea. I thought it both noteworthy and welcome that the Japanese prime minister—who in 2023 became the first postwar Japanese leader to visit a war zone when he visited Kyiv—went out of his way to urge for continued American aid to Ukraine in his address to Congress.
My guess is that if Trump were to win, the Japanese would do their best to manage him and avoid a crisis. They were able to do this as well, or better, than any other ally the last time Trump was in the White House as then Prime Minister Abe managed to connect with him on and off the golf course. But Trump’s erratic behavior toward North Korea and decision to leave the Trans-Pacific Partnership still hurt Japanese interests. Whether any Japanese prime minister could navigate the relationship as adeptly this time around is anybody’s guess, and the Japanese, like most others, are beginning to think through what they might have to do if a rift opens up between themselves and Washington.
Breaking China
It was also an interesting week when it comes to China. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen spent a few days there, and her trip made clear that there are now additional sources of friction buffeting what is arguably the most important bilateral relationship of the era.
For the last several years, U.S. policy has mostly focused on restricting China’s access to critical technologies with national security implications, above all advanced semiconductors. This continues to be a major concern for both sides, as Beijing opposes these restrictions given their ability to slow its already slowing economic growth while Washington maintains they are necessary.
Yellen, though, appeared to emphasize another source of tension: growing U.S. unhappiness with Chinese excess capacity in areas like electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and solar panels. China’s massive subsidization of these industries and the flood of exports that is hitting global markets threatens the future viability of Western manufacturers who specialize in these products. While China has been talking about shifting the engine of its economic growth away from exports and toward domestic consumption, thus far it has shown little indication that it is going to implement the policies needed to make this shift; as the saying goes, China has talked the talk but not walked the walk.
China, for its part, argues it is not acting unfairly and that the United States and Europe are hiding behind protectionism to help themselves at China’s expense. Chinese protests won’t carry much weight though given government subsidies of Chinese manufacturers; it seems more a question of when tariffs of some sort are introduced against China, worsening an economic relationship already hobbled by sanctions and export controls. The immediate post-Cold War era, in which economic ties provided the ballast for U.S.-Chinese relations, is long gone.
Six Days & Six Months
A principal legacy of the 1967 Six Day War was Israel gaining control of territories housing millions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. The current six-month war is now one consequence. It was not inevitable—little in history is—but it became all too possible given Hamas’s ideology, Israel’s underestimation of it as a threat, and the historic failure of Israelis and Palestinians alike to bring into existence a viable Palestinian state that was prepared to coexist peacefully with Israel.
So where are we? Israel has seriously degraded Hamas as an organized military force. Israel could degrade it further by attacking Rafah, something Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is under pressure to do given his own rhetoric (and definition of victory) and growing pressure from his coalition partners. But doing so would inevitably deepen the rift with America and the Biden administration given the civilian suffering that would result, and it could trigger a reduction in the flow of weapons to Israel, conditions restricting their use, or both. Some Israelis and this prime minister might judge this is a price worth paying, but it is anything but clear it would be.
To the contrary, a massive attack on Rafah would compound the error that has characterized Israel’s response to October 7: Israel is conducting a conventional military operation in an unconventional context. “Battlefield” gains against Hamas units cannot be translated into lasting security outcomes; one could argue the opposite is true. Absent a serious, and thus-far nonexistent, political strategy for governing Gaza and for satisfying at least some Palestinian political aspirations, Hamas or something even more radical will likely reconstitute itself. The occupation will grow ever more costly as armed resistance will also become increasingly common in the West Bank. Hamas cannot be destroyed, much less marginalized, by military might alone. I will be blunt: Israel cannot succeed on its current trajectory.
One more thing. There is considerable speculation about the possibility of an Iranian or Iranian proxy attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s recent strike in Syria that killed several senior Iranian military officials. It is of course possible, but I would be surprised. Iran has thus far avoided direct attacks on Israel; more likely I would think are attacks on Israeli or Jewish targets somewhere else in the world or, even more ominously, an effort by Iran to militarize resistance to Israeli occupation of the West Bank, where it has been infiltrating weapons.
Iran and Hezbollah have held off starting a full-fledged war in the north since October 7. Initiating such a conflict now would surely impose severe costs on Israel but also on Hezbollah and Lebanon. It is also not certain that Iran would remain a sanctuary since this move would shift the current narrative away from the controversial Israeli response to October 7 and toward Iranian-backed aggression. It is hard to see how that would help Iran. The current Israeli government for its part might be tempted to initiate such a war for this exact purpose and for the valid reason that between fifty and one hundred thousand Israelis have been forced to evacuate their homes in Israel proper. One of the rules of the Middle East is that bad situations can get worse, and we may come to see that rule in full effect.
Abortion & Inflation, the Border & a Break
As seems to have become the norm, it was a mixed week for both prospective candidates. Trump’s strategy of trying to have it both ways on abortion, getting credit on the right for appointing justices to the Supreme Court who overturned Roe V. Wade without alienating everyone else by ushering in a national ban, came a cropper. Trump released an official statement in which he voiced support for the right of states to set their own limits on abortion but did not endorse a national ban. Then Arizona went ahead and used a law originally enacted before it was even a state to prohibit all abortions other than those essential to saving the life of the mother. There is a decent chance that abortion politics will deliver Arizona to Biden and possibly affect the outcomes in several other swing states as well.
But the week wasn’t all good for the incumbent. Persistent inflation has rattled the markets and made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Fed to reduce rates between now and the election. Plus, inflation in food and the like had tended to undermine the political goodwill Biden could garner from an otherwise robust economy. So, one of his principal arguments for re-election was weakened.
The other issue that weighs against Biden (other than his age, something rumor has it time cannot fix) is the border. I was gob-smacked as the Brits like to say by Biden’s comment in his Univision interview (the same interview in which he termed Netanyahu's approach to Gaza “a mistake”) that the White House was still examining what authority the president had to close the border in the absence of the sort of legislation congressional Republicans scared of standing up to Trump refuse to pass. The time for examination is over. Biden should just do it—be it by dispatching troops to the border, refusing to grant asylum to anyone entering the country illegally, or, better yet, both—and take the hit from progressives, a hit that will prove to be much less significant for his re-election chances than the one he would otherwise take from Americans across the political spectrum who are fed up with an out-of-control border.
Last but (for me at least) not least, it promises to be a big weekend for sports. No more college basketball alas, but the final days of professional basketball’s regular season and the four days of the Masters. As will come as no surprise to anyone who has been reading this newsletter, there will be more on sporting developments next week, especially if the New York Knicks and Rory McIlroy have the sort of weekend I am rooting for.
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Richard Haass in the news
Friday, April 5: MSNBC Morning Joe
Sunday, April 7: CBC News
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