Cry Havoc! (April 4, 2025)
Welcome to Home & Away. Once again, there are far more subjects than there is space to cover them. March Madness has given way to March Sanity in the world of college basketball, as seven of the eight number one seeds have reached the Final Four in both the men’s and women’s brackets. The Trump administration is exerting new pressures on additional universities and law firms, some of which are capitulating—perpetuating the cycle I warned about last week. As for Columbia University, it now has its third president in less than two years. There are reports that the use of Signal was the norm rather than the exception in this National Security Council (NSC); if this keeps up, I expect it is only a matter of time before you will be able to book the Situation Room for private dinners.
And speaking of the NSC, there was a wave of firings there this week after right-wing conspiracy theorist Laura Loomer met with Trump and evidently succeeded in her mission of convincing him that certain high-level NSC staffers were insufficiently loyal. She may also have had a hand in the decision to fire the head of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, the latest in a line of senior generals and admirals to be purged. At the same time, elections in Wisconsin and Florida suggest voters are fast losing their enthusiasm for Elon Musk and his boss. And Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., amid an ongoing measles outbreak, continues to gut the institutions needed to protect this country’s health now and in the future.
As for Away, French courts found Marine Le Pen guilty of embezzlement and banned her from running for office for five years, a ruling that, if it stands, would derail her plan to run in 2027 but could easily boomerang by further delegitimizing the government and the rule of law in the eyes of her supporters. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol was removed from office when the country’s constitutional court upheld the parliamentary vote to impeach him in the wake of his disastrous effort to impose martial law. The odds of military action against Iran, carried out by Israel alone or with the United States, are rising as diplomacy is not keeping up with Iran’s nuclear advances. Meanwhile, a visit by the vice president to Greenland arguably made a bad situation with our Danish ally even worse.
Then there were Trump’s musings that he is serious about seeking a third term despite the 22nd Amendment’s clear two-term limit, multiple incidents of individuals being detained or deported without due process (and no apparent remedy for accidental deportations caused by “administrative error”), and mounting signs that democracy is under severe pressure not just in this country but in Turkey and Israel as well. So much is going on that we seem to have lost our ability to pay serious attention to the worsening situation in Gaza, an issue that dominated our collective focus for the better part of a year after October 7, 2023. I could go on, but to spare me and you alike, I will stop and focus on two wars, one economic and one military, and both, as it turns out, wars of choice.
The Dogs of War: I
This week’s newsletter title comes, of course, from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Distraught and alone with the body of the slain Caesar, Mark Antony starts planning his revenge, to be accomplished by riling up the assembled against the assassins. “Cry ‘Havoc!’ and let slip the dogs of war.”
With Wednesday’s announcement of unprecedented tariffs to be levied against foe and friend alike, President Trump has caused havoc and let slip the dogs of economic war. Just to summarize: he announced both an across-the-board, baseline 10% tariff on all imports and additional tariffs on imports from those countries he deems to be “bad actors,” many of which are our critical allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The baseline tariff has been imposed without any justification, i.e., there is nothing specified in the way of export subsidies or tariffs or non-tariff barriers against U.S. exports.
To describe the additional tariffs on goods coming from specified countries as “arbitrary” would be generous. Rather than the result of a rigorous process that looked at the sum of a country’s trade practices and calculated a proportional step, Trump’s team seems to have simply taken every bilateral trade deficit and divided it by that country’s exports to the United States, using half the resulting percentage as the tariff rate. To state the obvious, this has zero logic behind it. Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers noted on Twitter that “This is to economics what creationism is to biology, astrology is to astronomy, or RFK thought is to vaccine science. The Trump tariff policy makes little sense EVEN if you believe in protectionist mercantilist economics.”
With Americans now facing the largest tax increase since 1968, one passed at the height of the Vietnam War, we are ushering in a future of lower growth, higher inflation, increased unemployment, and fewer choices in goods. How severe this crisis becomes will be determined in part by whether Trump’s tariff regime leads to a cycle of retaliation that will further reduce demand for goods and services produced here while driving up the cost of imports that Americans rely on. Already, China has responded with 34% tariffs against American goods and with serious non-tariff measures against American companies. Although some Congressional Republicans have framed this announcement as only a starting point for negotiations, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has encouraged countries to hold off on retaliatory measures, other Trump officials insist that the tariffs are here to stay.
All this adds to the already considerable uncertainty that is leading businesses to put on hold plans for just about anything and everything. The optimistic case predicts stagflation, the pessimistic—and increasingly realistic one—recession. It is impossible to avoid the irony: tariffs imposed by a president (on legally questionable grounds) citing a non-existent economic emergency are bringing about an all-to-real economic emergency.
Tariffs will undoubtedly hurt consumers, a.k.a. American citizens. None other than Mike Pence, Trump’s former vice president, described the “Trump tariff tax” as “the largest peacetime tax hike in U.S. history.” Yale’s Budget Lab estimates the tariffs will cost the average family $3,800 a year. Meanwhile, the market’s reaction to Trump’s economic policies has already hammered the average 401(k). “Liberation Day” to be sure, but what we are being liberated from is our savings and our prosperity.
Worse yet, the consequences will transcend the economic. Unilateral tariffs that make no distinction between friend and foe will cause additional damage to this country’s alliances, alliances that, until this president, provided the United States an enormous advantage in its dealings with both China and Russia. The tariffs will also create new economic opportunities for China as countries look to reduce their exposure to U.S. policy and unpredictability.
What the tariffs will not do is trigger Trump’s promised wholesale renaissance in American manufacturing. Many of this country’s manufacturing jobs have disappeared for a variety of reasons. Yes, in some cases because of the practices of other countries—above all China—unfairly subsidizing exports to this country. Targeted tariffs are justified in such cases. But jobs also disappeared because of new technologies that increased productivity and reduced the need for workers. Or because higher wages and benefits here raised the costs of domestically produced goods to the point that they could not compete with goods from abroad.
A few other thoughts. There seems to be no one in the Trump administration with the knowledge and presence of mind to point out that bilateral trade deficits are not inherently bad and can reflect the simple reality that Americans want to spend more than save and that we want to buy more of what another country produces than vice versa. Nor are imports per se bad. They offer American consumers choice, can reduce inflationary pressures, and can spur innovation, much as imported consumer electronics in the 1980s and 90s pushed American tech companies to improve their own products. Trade was a major reason the U.S. economy did as well as it did over the past eighty years and that the quality of life here improved for so many Americans. A remedial course in David Ricardo and the theory of comparative advantage appears to be in order.
The Dogs of War: II
The war between Russia and Ukraine—Vladimir Putin’s war of choice—continues unabated. Both sides remain unable to achieve their stated objectives through military force.
There has been an uptick in significant diplomatic activity of late, though. A few weeks ago, Ukraine agreed to Washington’s proposed 30-day ceasefire, in large part to patch up relations with the Trump administration, which unraveled during the February 28 Oval Office confrontation between Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Russia rejected the ceasefire proposal, instead suggesting, but not implementing, a prohibition on attacking energy infrastructure. Both sides also indicated a readiness to accept a ceasefire in the Black Sea, but with Russia linking its support to a relaxation of sanctions, it is far from clear when—or even if—such a limited ceasefire would start, much less what it would encompass.
Such partial steps, if implemented, could be a way station to something more significant. But it is possible—or even probable—that partial steps would not lead to a comprehensive peace agreement. Russia could prosecute the war even if the Black Sea were not an active theater, and Moscow’s decision this week to begin its largest military call-up since 2011 further calls into question its sincerity with these negotiations.
Still, the biggest question remains U.S. policy. Thus far, the Trump administration has used a combination of pressure and incentives to persuade the two sides to stop fighting. But its approach has been skewed toward offering benefits to Russia while bringing heavy pressure to bear on Ukraine.
To be clear, it is appropriate to offer Russia certain carrots at this juncture. These could include a willingness to resume high-level contacts and restaff embassies, support for limited relaxation of sanctions if specified conditions are met, and allowing Russia to keep certain long-term objectives for Ukraine on the table.
What is not acceptable is to embrace flawed Russian positions, such as its claims to Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and/or Zaporizhzhia based on the results of illegal referenda conducted by Russian occupation forces amid ongoing fighting. It is one thing for Trump’s de facto envoy to the Kremlin to characterize Russia’s stance, quite another for him to adopt it as his own.
More broadly, there is no good reason to introduce final-status considerations at this point. The goal for now should be an open-ended ceasefire agreement, not a permanent peace treaty. In this instance, excessive ambition is likely to be the enemy of the possible.
To achieve a cessation of hostilities, the agreement ought to be as clean and simple as possible. Only two elements are essential for a viable ceasefire: a cessation of all hostilities, and a separation of forces, ideally with a peacekeeping contingent between them.
Everything else, including the disposition of territory and populations, should be left for final-status negotiations. For now, both sides should be allowed to arm or agree to security arrangements with third parties. Nothing should be done to preclude measures that would buttress a ceasefire. Russia should be permitted to retain North Korean troops on its territory; Ukraine could invite forces from European countries.
What is essential is for the U.S. to continue providing military and intelligence support to Ukraine, as such support is the only way to convince Putin that further stalling is not in his interest. Aid is also essential to ensuring that Ukraine maintains its ability to deter renewed Russian aggression even if there were a ceasefire agreement.
Although Trump has a penchant for tariffs, threatening to impose “secondary sanctions” or tariffs on those countries (such as China, India, and Turkey) who purchase large amounts of Russian energy should be avoided. Such a move would set back U.S. relations with those three countries more than it would affect Russian policy in Ukraine or contribute to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.
Again, there is no substitute for keeping the arms and intelligence spigot open for Ukraine. But military aid need not be unlimited. The goal should be to give Ukraine what it needs to deter and defend against Russian aggression, not to pursue the unrealistic objective of fully restoring its 1991 borders. To assert, as Steve Witkoff did, that there is no reason to worry about renewed Russian aggression is not serious. After all, the current war is Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine since 2014, when it illegally annexed Crimea. Given Putin’s intentions, ensuring deterrent capabilities is paramount.
Matters could come to a head by this summer, when the pipeline of congressionally approved arms for Ukraine is likely to run out. The Trump administration will have to decide (if it has not already done so) on the connection between the security relationship with Ukraine and U.S. diplomacy more broadly.
The February 2020 deal that the first Trump administration signed with the Taliban should give us pause. The agreement was negotiated over the head of America’s Afghan partners through direct talks with the Taliban, paving the way for the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan just a year and a half later. One can only hope that the price President Joe Biden paid, both domestically and internationally, for implementing Trump’s deal will lead Trump to think twice before abandoning Ukraine to a similar fate.
Trump should also keep in mind that abandoning Ukraine would not bring peace. Zelenskyy, who, thanks in no small part to the infamous Oval Office meeting is more popular than ever at home, would likely opt for no ceasefire or peace treaty rather than one that irreparably compromised Ukraine’s core interests. It could fight on in one form or another for years using domestically produced arms and weapons imported from Europe and Asia. Free of U.S. restrictions as a condition of aid, it might even be tempted to act more aggressively in its choice of targets within Russia, potentially creating an escalatory spiral.
At the same time, Russia would most likely view U.S. separation from Ukraine as an opportunity to press or even escalate militarily itself. Far from bringing peace, a U.S. military cutoff of Ukraine could actually exacerbate the fighting.
The stakes are high, and not just for Ukraine. What plays out with Russia will have a significant effect on the future of Europe, on whether China uses force against Taiwan, or North Korea against South Korea, and on how the United States is perceived both by its friends and enemies around the world at a time when its economic policies communicate it is an increasingly untrustworthy actor. We are fast dismantling an order that has largely served U.S. interests for eight decades without erecting anything in its place.
As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.
Richard Haass in the news
Friday, March 28: Chris Jansing Reports (on Greenland and Signal-gate)
Monday, March 31: Morning Joe (‘Exactly the Wrong Way’: Trump’s Russia Threat Misfires)
Monday, March 31: Diplomacy Is the Newest Front in the Russia-Ukraine War (Project Syndicate)
Wednesday, April 2: Trump, Tariffs, and the US (BBC documentary)
Check out The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens