Epic Folly (March 12, 2026)

Welcome to Home & Away. This week’s edition comes a day early to accommodate some travel and in three parts: an assessment of the costs and benefits of Operation Epic Fury, thoughts as to how the United States should approach the challenge of ending the conflict, and suggestions for where to go for smart analysis about the war.

Expense Accounting

It has been over forty years since the historian Barbara Tuchman wrote The March of Folly. The book examines wars that ought not to have been fought as they went against the self-interest of the empire or country that undertook them even when preferable alternatives were available. Tuchman’s thinking aligns with my own, with what I termed “wars of choice” in an op-ed published in 2003, months into the Iraq War, and in my subsequent book, Wars of Necessity, Wars of Choice.

The subtitle of Tuchman’s book is “From Troy to Vietnam.” An updated edition might well read, “From Troy to Iran” or, better yet, “From Troy to Iraq to Iran.” As has been widely pointed out, there was no new development that warranted responding with military force (Operation Epic Fury) against Iran at this time. There were as well other options available, including enhanced sanctions and diplomacy.

The latter was not given a serious chance. Yes, U.S. envoys (Messrs. Witkoff and Kushner) sat down with Iran’s foreign minister, but their approach blended maximal positions – effectively demanding an end to Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile force, and support for proxies – and minimal time for negotiation. The contrast with the administration’s seemingly endless willingness to give Russia the benefit of the doubt and compromise Ukraine’s interests could hardly have been starker.

The war also seems to be premised on a flawed assumption, namely, that Iran is a problem that can be solved – that the real threat it poses to its neighbors and beyond (both directly and through proxies) can be eliminated. The mechanism, at least in principle, for solving the Iran problem would arrive through regime change. But this would have required a strategy of patience, both to give sanctions greater time to increase pressure on an already weak Iranian economy and to provide the opposition with more time to organize itself and build connections to government figures. And even then, it would have been a long shot. A more realistic approach to Iran would be rooted in the view that it is a challenge to be managed.

But it is also true that even an unnecessary war of choice can still turn out well. And to be fair, from a tactical perspective this war has accomplished some significant things. Iran is much degraded and diminished militarily, in particular its ballistic missile force and navy.

Otherwise, the results are at best mixed. Iran’s nuclear program has been further disrupted but still exists. There is a large amount of enriched uranium in the vicinity of Isfahan, and an unknown amount of expertise, components, and fuel scattered around the country. Many of Iran’s leaders have been killed, but Iran’s leadership as a whole has survived and a new Supreme Leader – the son of the slain Supreme Leader – has been selected. The country still has the ability to produce and launch drones and lay mines, something that has brought shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to a near halt and that has destroyed various facilities around the region. It is not at all apparent that continued military operations will fundamentally alter this reality.

After close to two weeks, the costs of this war far outweigh the benefits. The conclusion is clear: this war of choice was ill-advised. This assessment is bolstered by this list of ten direct and indirect costs:

--The war weakens the global norm against preventive war. Preventive war is the use of military force to interrupt the development of a gathering military threat. It is thus distinct from a preemptive use of force against an imminent threat. Preemptive attacks are widely viewed as a legitimate form of self-defense. Preventive attacks are not, and a world of preventive attacks would be one of frequent conflict.

--The war has highlighted the costs of being an ally of an increasingly unilateral United States. Gulf states are seeing their economies and the lives of their citizens badly disrupted. The same holds for Asian and European allies who are feeling the economic effects of higher energy costs alongside tariffs. The absence of consultations before the war makes all this worse.

--The war is a boon for Vladimir Putin and Russia. It is using up U.S. munitions (above all air defense systems) at a rapid rate and highlights the reality that for this administration helping Ukraine defend itself is not a priority. Russia also benefits from higher energy prices and eased energy sanctions.

--The war is also a boon for China, which has largely insulated itself from any oil shortages and which similarly benefits from U.S. munitions being used that would otherwise make their way to Taiwan or be needed by U.S. forces in a conflict with China. The removal of THAAD air defenses from South Korea, which China pressured Seoul for years to abandon, further illustrates the strategic gains for China.

--The war may increase incentives for countries to acquire nuclear weapons, as Iran (as was the case with Ukraine, Libya, Iraq, and Venezuela) is another example of a non-nuclear country being attacked while North Korea has escaped such a fate. And it certainly increases the desire inside Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

--The outbreak of this war complicates the future role of negotiations, as it broke out while they were taking place—much as the decision was made to launch the attacks against Iran’s three nuclear facilities last June even though another round of negotiations was planned.

--The war weakens the norm against political assassination as a tool of national security. Yes, attacking command and control targets is not literally assassination, but decapitation efforts, such as those the U.S. and Israel carried out against Iran’s leadership, are what they appear to be. And one danger of such attacks (in addition to undermining the ability of the opposing side to control the unauthorized use of military force and to carry out negotiations) is that they encourage such attacks on U.S. citizens, be they elected officials, diplomats, military personnel, or business leaders.

--All wars involve human costs, and this one is no exception. So far seven U.S. servicemen and women have been killed; well over one hundred have been injured. This cost would obviously go up significantly if the president were to commit ground troops. On top of this are the deaths of civilians in Iran and other countries.

--In addition, all wars entail economic costs. In this case, we are looking at higher energy and food prices, renewed inflation, and reduced economic growth. Many corporations have no option but to put major decisions on hold. The future of data centers in the region is now in question. There are as well the costs associated with increased military activity. So far, we are looking at something between $10 and $20 billion; at this rate, this number is likely to increase by something on the order of $1 billion a day.

--The war will strengthen isolationism in the United States. It already exists, in no small part because of the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. But this already unpopular war will add to it as costs come to be seen as outweighing benefits at a time many Americans want this president to focus on affordability and other domestic matters.

End Game

The debate over the wisdom of launching this war is a worthy one, but one that needs to be deferred for now. The immediate questions are: 1) whether to end it and 2) how to end it.

There are in principle two reasons for sustaining armed attacks on Iran. First, continued attacks would further degrade Iran’s military capabilities. But they cannot eliminate them, much less prevent Iran from reconstituting. Meanwhile, Iran would continue attacking its neighbors and making the Strait of Hormuz unusable. The longer this war goes on, the more the balance between its costs and benefits shifts toward the former.

The second reason put forward to continue this war is that it might bring about regime change of some sort (i.e. a less ideological, more pragmatic leader focused on promoting Iran’s development rather than regional instability). Some are now terming this “regime alteration.” This may be welcome, but there is no feasible military operation to bring it about. It qualifies as hope, not a strategy. And again, in the interim, the direct and indirect costs of the war would mount.

Even the president seems to be coming around to the view that this war needs to end. It turns out the most potent checks and balances in the American political system nowadays are not to be found in Congress or the courts but in markets and polls. The challenge becomes how. The difficulty is that while the United States initiated this conflict on its own, it will require both Israel and Iran to sign on to stopping it.

Israel, for its part, wants to continue the war to weaken Iran and possibly trigger change in its leadership. But as already discussed, this policy has uncertain prospects and every likelihood of increasing the war’s costs, as the current regime has demonstrated it believes it is in an existential fight and will do nearly anything to survive. More to the point, Israel’s interests are narrower than America’s. There is, however, a viable policy option: Donald Trump, by dint of his standing in Israel, is in a position to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, who cannot afford to alienate Trump in the run-up to Israel’s election, to stop. The question is whether Trump is willing to. It is about that simple.

Iran is the more complex variable. It wants to retaliate and, having lost so much already, may believe (with some reason) that the United States has more to lose from a long war than it does. Iranian leaders may also believe (again with reason) that American aversion to a long war gives them leverage in any informal or formal end-of-war negotiation. At the same time, Iran’s leaders have an interest in consolidating authority and beginning the long process of rebuilding and restoring economic growth, essential if internal opposition to the regime is not to grow.

The United States needs an outcome that allows shipping to resume, ends Iran’s attacks on its neighbors, and prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It is highly unlikely we can achieve these ends through the use of military force. The nuclear objective will require a negotiated ceiling on nuclear materials and equipment coupled with an adequate inspection mechanism. It is thus time to revive diplomacy.

In return for Iran agreeing to objectives along the lines of those articulated above, we would declare an end to armed attacks and the easing of some sanctions. More sanctions could be lifted in response to Iran’s willingness to reduce ballistic missile and drone production, curtail support to proxies, and improve the treatment of its population. We could approach all this in two phases: an initial standdown or ceasefire, to be followed by a more formal accord.

The above scenario is not without its drawbacks, but it is certainly superior to the alternatives of war and hoping for regime change. Simply declaring “mission accomplished” and walking away is a formula for the war and economic turmoil to continue. To add to this, periodic military operations, or “mowing of the lawn,” to use the awful phrase that appears from time to time in Israel and this country, would mean that shipping would never resume and that investment in the Gulf countries would effectively stop. It turns out that negotiations similar to those that preceded the war are likely to be the best and only means for ending it.

Keeping Up

Several people have asked me how I try to keep up with all things Iran. I begin the day with News Items, put out six days a week by my friend and podcast partner John Ellis. These days you are likely to find at least a half dozen items or more in his newsletter culled from a range of sources dedicated to Iran.

The best analyst on the war I have encountered is Danny Citrinowicz. He is an Israeli with a background in military intelligence. You can find his work on the INSS website (inss.org.il) and on X (@citrinowicz).

In addition, I highly recommend the analysis of the war produced by Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago. His articles pop up from time to time in all the usual places, but again I would go to X: @ProfessorPape. “Comment is Freed,” a Substack newsletter produced by my old Oxford friend Lawrence Freedman and his son Sam, is well worth subscribing to.

On the energy side, I find myself reading Javier Blas and Carolyn Kissane. Blas can be found on X (@JavierBlas) and Bloomberg; Kissane writes a weekly Substack newsletter “Energy Common Sense.”

For insight into Iranian politics there are Karim Sadjadpour (@ksadjadpour) of the Carnegie Endowment and Vali Nasr (@Vali_nasr) of Johns Hopkins SAIS. I have also learned a good deal about Iran’s thinking from Hamidreza Azizi (@HamidRezaAz). There are in addition any number of Iran experts (or generalists with something to say about Iran) to be found at the leading American think tanks: Brookings, AEI, CSIS, CFR, the Atlantic Council, and the Washington Institute. One can only hope that some of this insight and understanding will make its way to policymakers.

As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.

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Richard Haass in the news

Monday, March 9: Financial Times on Iran.

Monday, March 9: NPR on Iran.

Tuesday, March 10: Alternate Shots Episode 20.

Tuesday, March 10: Bloomberg on Economic Effects of Iran War.

Tuesday, March 10: The Free Press on Iran.

Tuesday, March 10: Chris Matthews on Iran.

Wednesday, March 11: Morning Joe on Iran.

Wednesday, March 11: Anderson Cooper on Iran.

Wednesday, March 11: CNBC on Iran.

Wednesday, March 11: The Free Press Debate with Niall Ferguson.