Hot Air (December 15, 2023)
Welcome to Home & Away. It’s only been a few days since the last newsletter, so I will endeavor to keep this one relatively short.
On the Defensive
All three topics this week have both domestic and international dimensions. I will start with Ukraine. It has been a difficult but revealing week. President Zelensky came to Washington but met with little success, if success is defined as persuading Congress to approve significant new military and economic assistance to his country. This was followed by additional bad news in Europe, as the EU failed to pass a multiyear aid package for Ukraine due to Hungary’s objections. Much more welcome was the announcement that the EU did agree to open accession talks with Ukraine, although this is at best a multi-year process and in no way offsets the delays in meeting Ukraine’s immediate economic and battlefield needs.
In the United States, one reason for this hesitance to provide more aid to Kyiv is revived isolationist sentiment, especially in what not too long ago was an internationalist Republican Party. Recent polls show nearly half of Republicans think the United States is providing too much aid to Ukraine, compared to 16 percent of Democrats. I would add here that Ukraine hurt itself by raising expectations for its spring counter-offensive, which failed to turn the momentum of the war in Kyiv’s favor. Its lack of success in regaining territory seized by the Russians underscored the gap between Ukraine’s stated goals and its ability to realize them, giving skeptics of aid the argument that the time has come to stop throwing good money after unrealistic ends.
For this and other reasons, Charlie Kupchan and I argued several weeks back in Foreign Affairs that the United States ought to press Ukraine to recast its strategy, to emphasize defense (and the permanent survival of the country) over the liberation of Crimea and the Donbas. The goal of Ukraine focusing on holding on to what it still controls is achievable, compelling, and less resource intensive. Liberating the remaining twenty percent of the country, no matter how desirable, simply does not seem feasible for the foreseeable future. Ukraine can and should retain the long-term objective of restoring its territorial integrity, but that will likely need to be achieved at the negotiating table. In this vein, I was pleased to see a major story in the New York Times suggesting that members of the Biden administration are pressing Ukraine to shift its strategic focus along the lines we advocated.
Recent machinations in Washington notwithstanding, I would still bet that Ukraine gets additional military and economic help from this country early next year. Yes, it will require some deal on the southern border, but this is also desirable, as the massive influx of migrants cannot and should not be allowed to continue. The two major parties may actually be able to save one another from their own excesses: Republicans can require Democrats to finally ignore some of the most strident advocates of a more open border, while Democrats can help Republicans push back against their isolationist wing.
A Time for Every Purpose
The story in the Middle East this week is that both President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu are no longer bothering to hide their frustrations with one another. On Wednesday, Biden told donors that Israel was in danger of losing international support. Disagreements persist concerning both how Israel is prosecuting the war, which Biden described as including indiscriminate bombings, and also, more fundamentally, about what comes when this stage of the war winds down. The President clearly favors empowering the Palestinian Authority, so that it can assume a major role in Gaza and assist in moving towards a two-state solution. The prime minister opposes any such moves, preferring an open-ended Israeli occupation of Gaza and continued Israeli settlement of the West Bank.
This now public disagreement presents each leader with a choice. President Biden must choose whether to ease up on pressuring Israel lest he alienate its American supporters, who traditionally have played a large role in the Democratic Party. His dilemma is that by allowing Israel to do what it wants, he could well alienate Arab- and Muslim-Americans along with younger progressives, all of whom tend to side with the Palestinian cause more than Israel’s.
Bibi Netanyahu, for his part, has to decide whether he would be better served politically by taking on the United States and its president. Traditionally, Israeli prime ministers have paid a price for mishandling that country’s most important bilateral relationship, but Netanyahu appears to be calculating that in the wake of October 7, a more hawkish and angrier Israeli public might actually reward him if he were to be seen as standing up to American pressure and opposing a Palestinian state.
I wrote a few days ago that the Biden administration could stick with its present policy of privately and publicly taking issue with Israel even if it is increasingly obvious its advice is being ignored. Or it could distance itself from Israel in the United Nations, limit or condition its arms exports, or both. The problem is that the first of these three approaches has come up empty and the other two might actually play into Netanyahu’s hands if he could portray them as threatening Israel’s core security. I expect he will not be able to do this successfully with the news (warranted I would argue) that the United States is holding up licenses for selling 20,000 rifles to Israel in response to concerns about settler violence in the West Bank.
All of which brings me back to the notion of launching a diplomatic initiative in tandem with the Saudis, who were pursuing a peace agreement with the Israelis before October 7, and those Arab states that have already made peace with Israel. The initiative would encompass a path for governing and rebuilding Gaza, one in which all the parties would work with the Palestinian Authority so that it could assume a meaningful role there. This in turn would require articulating the contours of a new diplomatic initiative (including the core principles of final status arrangements) designed to satisfy some Palestinian requirements while simultaneously addressing Israel’s security concerns. It would put the Biden administration at odds with this Israeli prime minister and his government over Gaza, settlements, and Palestinian statehood. This difference would form the backdrop to a probable Israeli election in 2024. It is high risk, but what is certain is that Israel’s continued drift will further radicalize Palestinians, result in an Israel that is a permanent and non-democratic occupier, and weaken not only the U.S.-Israel relationship but also both countries’ position in the region and the world. All of which is to say there is risk no matter what the direction of U.S. policy.
As I expect you all have noticed, this section of the newsletter comes under the heading “A Time for Every Purpose,” which comes from the Book of Ecclesiastes. (I expect some of you believe it was coined by Pete Seeger and made famous by The Byrds, but not so.) I mention it only because we are fast arriving at a point of no return; the time for any sort of peace between Israelis and Palestinians is soon or never. The two-state solution is imperfect, and getting from here to there will prove difficult and then some, but for all that I continue to believe (if I may channel and paraphrase Churchill on democracy) that it is the worst possible outcome for Israelis and Palestinians except for all the others.
Over and (COP)-Out
The third and final subject I want to cover is the just-concluded COP-28 climate gathering in Dubai. The setting was less than auspicious, in that 2023 has been the hottest year on record and one of increased fossil fuel production. Having the UAE, a major oil exporter, as host of the gathering only added to the challenge.
On the surface, some observers might argue the outcome was not bad. After two weeks and an extended deadline, the delegates agreed to call for transitioning away from fossil fuels, to triple what is spent on renewable energy, and to cut methane emissions. In addition, a loss and damage fund was established.
That said, it is fair to question what was actually accomplished. The final statement was non-binding. The pace of the transition to renewable energy was left vague (which climate activists will not like but I actually see as a plus since oil, and especially natural gas, will be needed for decades). Language opposing new coal-fired power plants was deleted. It is all but certain that the so-called international community will fail to meet the existing goal of limiting the increase in the world’s temperature to “only” 1.5 degrees (centigrade). The loss and damage fund, with under $1 billion to spend, will hardly make a dent.
In short, why anyone would describe COP-28 as a landmark, or historic achievement, or even a success, is beyond me. Climate change remains a vexing and serious problem for the world. It is a slow-motion crisis that for most governments lacks the urgency to generate adequate, or even near-adequate, corrective action. Just about everyone wants others to solve the problem for them, either because they do not want to accept any economic sacrifice, see the problem as the fault of others, or both. This is a formula for failure. If there is hope, it is in technologies that could dramatically reduce carbon release, capture carbon already released, improve batteries and renewables, expand nuclear power, and in extremis take measures that cool the atmosphere. As for future COPs, they are more likely to be a side show than the main event.
As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.
Richard Haass in the news
Monday, December 11: MSNBC Morning Joe on the Qatari government sending money into Gaza
Wednesday, December 13: MSNBC Morning Joe on Netanyahu’s leadership in Israel
Thursday, December 14: Wall Street Journal CEO Council on world politics
Check out The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens