Welcome to Home & Away. The war with Iran is at a critical juncture: after some five weeks, a ceasefire has been agreed to by the United States and Iran but has not been implemented. It is not even clear what it entails. Peace talks are slated to begin in a day. As a result, the protagonists and all those affected by the conflict (which is just about everyone) find themselves somewhere between war and peace, a gray area that is likely to describe the situation for some time to come.
I want to share several things. First, a piece just published in Project Syndicate that offers up a preliminary assessment of the war and its effects, emphasizing those who are in a stronger position and those who appear to have lost more than they gained.
The big winners include Russia and China, and possibly Ukraine, while the principal losers include the Arab states that neighbor Iran, the Iranian people, and America’s European and Pacific partners. Interestingly, a strong case can be made that while Iran lost by conventional measures of war, it is emerging as a strategic winner…and that the opposite holds true for both the United States and Israel. Indeed, my answer to the straightforward question, “Is the United States better off than it was five weeks ago?”, is a resounding “No.”
Inside Strait
I also provide links to two other articles. The first, written by yours truly with Niall Ferguson and Philip Zelikow, argues that Iran cannot be allowed to remain in control of the Strait of Hormuz. It proposes the creation of a new Strait of Hormuz Company in which Iran, the other seven coastal states, and several outside maritime powers (possibly including the United States, China, Japan, India, South Korea, the EU, and the UK) would assume obligations for safe passage and the imposition and sharing of fees. The incentive for Iran to go along is that the Strait will (if our recommendations are adopted) either be open for all or closed to all, thereby depriving it of leverage and revenue if it refuses to go along.
Gut Punch
The second is a column by Peggy Noonan in The Wall Street Journal. Titled “In Gut We Trust,” it calls out the president and those who stand by him for his handling of the war. The critique is equal parts strategic and moral. And, as one has come to expect from Peggy, it is both eloquent and powerful.
Speaking of links, I also include links to my conversation with Katie Couric and to the most recent episode of Alternate Shots, my regular podcast with my buddy John Ellis.
The Iran War’s Winners and Losers
A two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran has been agreed, but much remains unclear. What will it entail? Will it last? Will it even materialize? Most importantly, where will it lead?
The good news is that many of the pressures that brought about the ceasefire remain in place. None of the combatants’ interests would be served by the deployment of US ground forces, attacks on Iran’s civilian infrastructure, or the destruction of neighboring Gulf countries’ water-treatment facilities, oil refineries, or data centers. This is not to predict the emergence of a formal, comprehensive, and lasting peace. But it does suggest that a return to full-scale war, while possible, is not inevitable. This allows us to make a preliminary assessment of the war and its effects.
The big winner is Russia. Its economy has benefited significantly from rising energy prices. US relaxation of sanctions on Russian oil added to the windfall and could well outlast the return of energy prices to pre-war levels. The Kremlin also gained from America’s use of weapons that could have gone to Ukraine and are not easily replaced, and the deterioration in America’s relationship with Europe has further weakened NATO, a long-standing goal of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
China has also come out a winner. It benefits from a renewed US focus on the Middle East, which translates into reduced US forces and firepower in the Indo-Pacific, meaning that fewer weapons would be available for any Taiwan contingency. Moreover, with the US having significantly undermined its standing in the Middle East with its reckless war, China could emerge as a sought-after partner in the region.
Who is worse off? The conflict was clearly bad for US-European relations and Taiwan, as well as for Ukraine, because of Russia’s gains. At the same time, however, Ukraine’s cutting-edge drone technology has helped the country establish new commercial and security ties with Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
A more aggressive Iran has exposed the vulnerabilities of the Arab states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman). Now they must live under Iran’s shadow and face the possibility of renewed conflict, putting the region’s economic model—built on stability, foreign investment, and tourism—at risk.
The other principal loser of the war is not a country but a population: the Iranian people. The regime, having already killed tens of thousands of civilians before the war began, is now more entrenched than ever, with arguably more hardline leaders. None of this bodes well for Iranians’ economic prospects or freedom.
The three countries most affected by the conflict are the most difficult to assess. All gained and lost, but some lost more than others.
Iran lost much of its conventional military might. Its economy, already in terrible condition before the war, is in far worse shape now. Many political and military leaders were killed.
But one can also argue that Iran gained from the war. It demonstrated a capacity to stand up successfully to the US and absorb punishment while still being able to hurt others and exert regional influence. Iran is also likely to play a significant, if not exclusive, role in the operation of the Strait of Hormuz going forward, which will give it leverage and possibly revenue. It may well retain elements of its nuclear program. For the foreseeable future, the regime appears secure.
As for Israel, many of its war aims have not been met. Israel reduced, but did not eliminate, Iran’s ability to project power. It did not bring about the regime change it sought, and the leadership change that did materialize will likely be to Israel’s detriment.
It remains unclear whether any peace agreement will preclude Iranian support for its proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis) or limit its stock of ballistic missiles and drones. A peace agreement might even impose constraints on Israel’s ability to use military force against Iran and its proxies.
The US-Israel relationship could also be worse off. The American left’s outrage over the Gaza War had already put these historic ties under pressure. Now, Americans on the right increasingly argue that Israel led the US into a foreign war to serve its own interests. Should Israel break the ceasefire and draw the US back in, attitudes toward it may worsen.
US President Donald Trump started the war under the apparent assumption that it would be quick and easy, like the intervention in Venezuela. But the administration’s desired outcomes—a decisive military victory, an end to Iran’s nuclear program, and regime change—did not materialize. In the process, 13 American soldiers died and hundreds were wounded. Several aircraft were shot down. Five weeks of war cost tens of billions of dollars. Munitions were consumed far faster than they can be replaced.
The war also exposed America’s inability to provide adequate defense for its allies in the region, weakening those relationships. America’s decision not to consult with many of its allies before attacking Iran has increased the perception that it is erratic and dismissive of others’ legitimate concerns.
Meanwhile, the cost of gasoline has shot up at home, and farmers are contending with a fertilizer shortage. All this suggests that higher inflation and a slower economy are likely. Trump, for his part, often appeared unsteady, with his social-media posts raising questions about his judgment and temperament. Objectives were neither clear nor constant, and the policymaking apparatus looked dysfunctional.
Trump can and will continue to insist that the war was a great success, but the reality is different. Tactical successes on the battlefield and the impressive rescue of a pilot cannot disguise what is emerging as a strategic defeat.
While campaigning for president against the incumbent Jimmy Carter in 1980, Ronald Reagan asked the American people: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” Many thought not, which contributed to Reagan’s victory that November. A similar question could be asked of Americans today: “Are you better off than you were five weeks ago?” The answer is a resounding “No.”
If the Iran war had been one of necessity—if America’s vital interests were in jeopardy and there was no alternative to the use of military force—the great cost to the US and its allies might be justified. But the US had time and other options. Yet Trump undertook a war of choice—a decision that history will almost certainly judge harshly.
The Sporting Life
The second round of the Masters is just getting underway. The first day was an impressive one for defending champion Rory McIlroy, who finished the day tied for the lead at five-under-par alongside Sam Burns. My pick, Cameron Young, had a terrible front nine but rallied on the back, finishing the day at one over, six shots off the pace. The good news is that he has three rounds to go. And the good news for the rest of us is that we get to watch three more days of great golf.
As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.
Richard Haass in the news
Wednesday, April 8: Katie Couric on Iran, National Security.
Thursday, April 9: Alternate Shots Episode 23.
Thursday, April 9: The Free Press on Iran.
Friday, April 10: Project Syndicate on Iran.
What happened over five weeks isn’t just a tactical ledger, it’s a legitimacy event. The U.S. entered as the uncontested arbiter of Middle East security architecture. It exits as one actor among several, with China waiting patiently in the anteroom and Gulf states quietly updating their hedging calculus.
The Iran-as-strategic-winner argument is the most important and least comfortable conclusion here. Regimes that survive superpower military campaigns don’t just survive, they’re immunized. The domestic narrative writes itself: we absorbed the full weight of American airpower and we’re still here. That’s not a talking point. That’s a founding myth for the next generation of Iranian nationalism.
The Hormuz proposal is elegant but assumes Iran responds to institutional incentives. A regime that just demonstrated its indispensability through asymmetric resistance has little reason to trade leverage for revenue-sharing arrangements it doesn’t control. You don’t voluntarily enter a multilateral framework immediately after proving you don’t need one.
The deepest loss isn’t military or diplomatic. It’s the erosion of the assumption that American power is purposeful. Erratic objectives, unsecured alliances, and a five-week war that produced none of its stated goals—-that’s not a setback.
That’s a data point other capitals will cite for decades.
—Johan
Former FSO
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I always enjoying reading your post and feel it’s a much needed voice of truth and reason - especially in these dark times. One thing I have started to feel is that the reduction of Iran’s ability to create a nuclear weapon is no longer an issue. They have discovered something much stronger - the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz.