Israel, Iran, and Maybe U.S. War (June 19, 2025)

Welcome to Home & Away. Today, I will focus exclusively on the issue that has taken up almost all my time of late: the war between Israel and Iran—and quite possibly the United States—now entering its second week. My own views are captured in the various Substack conversations and other appearances linked below as well as a print and online column for the Financial Times. I’ve included the text below, but the bottom line is that there are no cost- or risk-free options, and that terms such as “solution” or “finish this off once and for all” ought to be banned. That said, all things being equal (or, more precisely, unequal), I favor a diplomatic approach if it can be achieved, and the use of force by the United States if it cannot.

What I thought I would do here is discuss relevant episodes from contemporary history and see what lessons they have for us. Here are ten:

1. It is best to make a sincere, visible attempt to resolve a crisis diplomatically before turning to military force, given the inherent costs and risks associated for all actors with the latter. Such an effort also helps manage domestic and international reactions and build critical support for military action. A textbook example of such a sequential approach can be found in the George H.W. Bush administration’s conduct in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in the lead-up to the Gulf War.

2. Context matters. It is not clear that the 2003 Iraq War would have occurred without 9/11, which reduced American tolerance of threats, even distant potential ones, and increased George W. Bush’s desire to send a message to the world that the United States was willing and able to go on the offensive. Much the same can be said of Israel and Bibi Netanyahu post-October 7, particularly given the domestic backlash the prime minister has faced for his government’s failure to prevent the original attacks.

3. Not acting can be just as consequential as acting. In the early 1990s, the Clinton administration considered attacking North Korea’s nuclear program when it was still in its early and more vulnerable stages. Ultimately, the United States held off, fearing that such an attack could trigger a second Korean war that risked tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of South Korean and American casualties. It was an understandable decision, but one with a significant long-term cost. Today, North Korea’s nuclear program has progressed to include dozens of nuclear weapons and the intercontinental ballistic missiles needed to deliver them as far as the U.S. mainland. More recently, had Barack Obama considered both the immediate and longer-term consequences of inaction, he might have made a better decision about imposing costs after Syria’s chemical weapons use crossed his red line.

4. Israel in years past carried out preventive military strikes against single nuclear reactors in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007). These strikes successfully neutralized those emerging programs, but were far more limited in scale than what is being proposed by Israeli and U.S. policymakers now—in part because Iran’s nuclear program is far more advanced than Iraq and Syria’s and in part because Israel appears to have broader aims today, including regime change.

5. Speaking of regime change, it is easier to talk about than to carry out successfully. First, there is no way to assign this task to military force. I remember Colin Powell telling President Bush (41 I believe) that military force is good for breaking things and killing people but not for bringing about a change in governments, let alone producing desirable ones. Indeed, in the be careful what you wish for category, regime change can bring something as bad as or worse than current leadership. Putin’s Russia and post-Gaddafi Libya come to mind. Making regime change a precondition for ending the war (as Israel’s defense minister appears to be doing) is both foolhardy and dangerous as it rules out a successful negotiation with the existing government and promises to extend the war.

6. We should not dismiss the possibility that a newly weakened Iran might accept a diplomatic offer similar to the one that it largely rejected just weeks before these attacks. There is precedent for this. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini reluctantly agreed to end the war with Iraq in 1988 to preserve the very revolution that brought the Islamic Republic into existence. Khomeini compared making this decision to drinking poison. It is possible that his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, might decide to drink poison in order to get Iran through its second greatest post-1979 crisis.

7. Bibi Netanyahu has launched a war of choice, not of necessity, as Israel still had other options to delay Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon—including the U.S.-led negotiations that were progressing as recently as last week. And it was a preventive war, not preemptive as he declared it to be, as the Iranian threat was gathering, not imminent, according to even U.S. intelligence assessments. Interestingly, this echoes the words and actions of the George W. Bush administration in the run up to the 2003 Iraq War. It doesn’t mean either or both were wrong in what they did (although history will almost certainly conclude that Bush was), but it does raise the bar for the policy outcome justifying the riskier choice.

8. As noted above, eliminating threats tends to be impossible to accomplish as a war aim. Hamas cannot be eliminated in Gaza, any more than Israel or the United States can permanently eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. Know-how will survive no matter how many scientists are killed, as will equipment and materials whose existence and locations are unknown or impossible to reach. What they can do is degrade the nuclear program and slow its development.

9. President Trump should reflect carefully on his options and consult qualified outside advisors (and shut out certain inside ones regardless of their official titles) as he sees fit. Such an approach served JFK well during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

10. All wars eventually end, but some end slowly and some end without achieving their originally stated goals. One reason is that it takes two or more to end a war but only one to start one. Russia’s war with Ukraine is now well into its fourth year, while Israel’s war against Hamas is halfway through its second. We are all understandably focused on what is happening in the coming days, but it is quite possible that this war will be with us for some time.

“How Trump Can Offer Iran a Way Out”

Until now, the initiative in the most recent Middle East conflict has been all Israel’s. It was Israel’s government that decided to undertake a war of choice, a preventive attack on the gathering nuclear threat posed by Iran. Israel has dominated the airspace over Iran, destroying or damaging several nuclear-related facilities, killing several senior military and nuclear officials, and further degrading Iran’s defences and its ability to launch retaliatory attacks against Israel.

But after less than a week, the Israeli war effort may have reached its limit: Israel alone cannot accomplish its two principal objectives. Ending Iran’s nuclear programme in the immediate term requires military capabilities that Israel does not possess. And the region’s history strongly suggests that bringing about regime change by force in Iran won’t be easy and may not bring about the desired result.

What happens next will therefore depend on the two other principal protagonists in this conflict: the US and Iran.

US policy so far has been inconsistent. Washington was against Israeli military action before seeming to accept and even claim credit for it. It has provided Israel with arms and helped defend it from retaliation but has not joined Israeli offensive actions. It made a run at a diplomatic settlement, held five rounds of talks with Iranian officials, and then gave up. Now President Donald Trump is demanding that Iran unconditionally surrender.

Currently the Trump administration is debating whether the US should attack the underground Iranian nuclear facility at Fordow, which can only be penetrated by large, heavy bunker-busting bombs carried by B-2 bombers, which Israel does not possess.

There is some relevant history here. In the early 1990s, Bill Clinton’s administration considered attacking North Korea’s nuclear programme when it was vulnerable and still in its early stages. Ultimately, the US held off, fearing that such an attack could trigger a second Korean war, one that would result in tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of South Korean and American casualties. It was an understandable decision, but came with a significant long-term cost. Today, North Korea has dozens of nuclear weapons along with the intercontinental ballistic missiles to deliver them as far as the US mainland.

The downside of a US attack on Iran is not comparable, in that Iran cannot do much more against Israel than it is already doing. But Iran could attack the 40,000 US forces stationed throughout the region. Tehran could also widen the war, choosing to threaten its recently improved relations with the Gulf states and attack its Arab neighbours, in the process driving up world energy prices.

An American strike on Fordow would also weaken the international norm against preventive military attacks, something Russia, China and North Korea might then choose to emulate. It would reduce America’s ability to respond effectively to military challenges elsewhere. It would more closely align the US with a deeply unpopular Israeli prime minister whose policies in Gaza and the occupied West Bank have outraged much of the world. And it is far from certain that a US attack will succeed if success is defined as destroying all that remains of Iran’s nuclear programme.

But allowing Fordow to survive makes it highly likely that Iran will manage sooner rather than later to produce nuclear weapons, something it is likely to see as essential in the wake of its failure to deter Israel in the current crisis.

Israel alone could slow, but not prevent, this outcome. And if a nuclear-armed Iran emerges, it would pose an existential threat to Israel and others. It would also be in a better position to resume support of its regional proxies. And an Iranian nuclear weapon would also prompt a number of other countries in the region to follow suit, putting the Middle East on a dangerous hair trigger.

There is no easy option without downsides. The best course of action for Trump now would be to give Iran one last chance to accept a diplomatic deal. Such a proposal would require that Iran agree to hand over all of its enriched uranium, dismantle centrifuges and other known elements of its nuclear programme, and agree to open-ended inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Such an offer would include relief for Iran from economic sanctions, a withdrawal of the US threat to attack, a larger ceasefire and some face-saving mechanism by which Iran could participate in a regional uranium enrichment consortium tied to the generation of nuclear energy, not weapons.

Iran might accept it. After all, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini reluctantly agreed to an end to the war with Iraq in 1988 to save the 1979 revolution that brought the Islamic Republic into existence. Khomeini compared making this decision to drinking poison.

The time is fast approaching when his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, might have to swallow the poison too.

As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.

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Richard Haass in the news

Friday, June 13: Katie Couric Media (“Israel Attacks Iran. Discussing What We Know With Richard Haass”)

Morning, June 16: Morning Joe (“Trump Should Make a Good-Faith Effort at Diplomacy in Iran”)

Tuesday, June 17: CNN International, Amanpour (“The United States Has a Big Decision to Make: Former American Diplomat on the Conflict in Iran and Israel”)

Tuesday, June 17: Squawk on the Street (“President Trump Should Give Iran One Last Opportunity to Make a Deal”)

Tuesday, June 17: “How Trump Can Offer Iran a Way Out” (Financial Times)

Wednesday, June 18: Fresh Hell With Tina Brown (“My Video Chat with the Foreign Policy Wise Man Richard Haass”)

Thursday, June 19: Chris Jansing Reports (“'Do They Think the Next Leader of Iran is Going to be Some Thomas Jefferson Speaking Farsi?”)

Check out The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens