Not Ripe (September 6, 2024)
Welcome to Home & Away. I will keep it short, in part because Labor Day has made for a short week.
Most of the focus here at home remains trained on the November elections, now only two months away. The stakes for most presidential elections tend to be limited, if only because similarities between the candidates far outweigh any differences. This cannot be said this time around. The differences – over taxes, spending, regulation, the role of government, access to guns, democracy, foreign policy, climate, abortion, and just about anything other than Nippon’s bid to buy U.S. Steel – are significant.
The country and the world will be deeply affected by this election, even if it results in a divided Congress that reins in some of the preferences of the next president. (The impact could be even greater if there is a contested outcome that results in prolonged political uncertainty accompanied by violence.) The polls indicate the race remains close. We will know soon enough what difference the much-anticipated September 10 debate makes.
While we are talking about domestic politics, I wanted to highlight an article in the New York Times. The piece revealed that there is only one candidate in roughly half of the thirty thousand political races in this country during any given year. More often than not, the Republican runs unopposed (except in certain urban areas where Democrats face little or no Republican opposition) because Democrats have concluded they stand little chance given gerrymandering or population sorting in venues where Red-inclined voters dominate. This should be a real source of concern, as a lack of competition breeds citizen apathy and political extremism.
No Deal
I do want to write about the Middle East in the wake of Hamas’s murder of six of the remaining hostages, including an American citizen. It would appear that Hamas has adopted new procedures in which it kills any hostage when it concludes a rescue attempt might be imminent. This only confirms what we already knew about Hamas, namely that it has little to no regard for human life, be it Israeli or Palestinian, Jewish or Muslim. More broadly, Hamas prefers confrontation to compromise.
The related question is what this awful development tells us about Israel.
It is always dangerous to ascribe motives, and I usually stay away from so doing and suggest to others that they likewise abstain. But it is difficult in these circumstances to conclude anything other than that the prime minister of Israel has opted for continued war over an agreement because he sees that such an outcome could well bring down his government, pave the way to investigations of what went wrong in the run-up to October 7, and expose him to legal jeopardy. It would be one thing to put off a ceasefire deal that brought the hostages back alive if continued military action or a presence in the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border would eliminate Hamas and the threat it poses to Israel. But it would not.
As has been clear since Israel began its military campaign following the attacks of October 7, Hamas can be degraded but not eliminated, and the effort to eradicate the group risks creating new recruits. What is more, Israel’s refusal to put forward a political plan for governing Gaza or for meeting at least some Palestinian political aspirations there or in the West Bank means that Hamas will face no serious internal challenge.
As for the United States, the sad truth is that it has been played by both Hamas and Benjamin Netanyahu. We have precious little to show for eleven months of entreaties, cajoling, attempts at persuasion, and shuttle diplomacy. Too much high-level diplomatic effort has been devoted to an effort that would not require such outside help if the parties were serious about reaching an agreement. Outside mediators can provide the missing five percent of a deal, but the basic willingness and ability to sign and live up to an agreement must come from the protagonists themselves. When these ingredients are absent—when the context for negotiation is unripe—no amount of mediation can break through.
Let me add that even if I am wrong here and a Gaza ceasefire deal emerges, it is unlikely to last or survive its initial phase. There is no common understanding between Israel and Hamas over a continued Israeli military presence in Gaza, Hamas’s role in governing the area, Hamas’s rejection of Israel, or the potential use of force by Israel if it gains intelligence about the whereabouts of the remaining leaders of Hamas.
So what should the United States do at this point? I would suggest President Biden announce that he has asked the secretary of state and the CIA director to focus on other matters. Other envoys can stay in touch with the parties. In short, we ought to dial down our involvement in the Middle East given the cost and opportunity cost of all we are doing.
But dialing down is not exiting. President Biden should publicly explain why he believes a ceasefire deal would be worth having, what stands in the way, and what needs to happen in Gaza down the road.
I also believe he should talk about the West Bank. The president should present U.S. parameters for near-, mid-, and long-term diplomacy, making clear what we expect from both Israel and the Palestinians. In that context, he should make the case as to why settlement activity is undermining what prospects exist for diplomacy and peace and why that would be bad not just for Palestinians but for an Israel that seeks to remain Jewish and democratic. If this all sounds something like a farewell address for this president and this part of the world, it is because it would be. Mr. Biden would not have the opportunity to follow through on his words, but they would provide a guide and a measuring stick for the future.
President Biden should also express his expectation that Israel will prevent additional settler violence and that it will apply the full weight of the law to anyone who commits such violence. The United States should sanction those behind settler violence and label goods produced in the occupied territories as just that rather than made in Israel.
What the United States should not do is sanction Israel over its decision to prioritize the war against Hamas over getting the hostages back, no matter how misguided many (including this author) believe this Israeli policy to be. It is the Israeli government’s prerogative. Washington should only curtail or stop the provision of arms to Israel if it judges that they are being used in a manner inconsistent with U.S. and international law. And despite any and all differences between Washington and Tel Aviv over how to deal with Gaza and the West Bank, the U.S. government should continue to maintain strategic support for Israel and a strategic dialogue with it over how best to contend with the direct and indirect threats posed by Iran. If all this sounds complicated and then some, it is because it would be.
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Richard Haass in the news
Netanyahu ‘doing nothing’ to get hostages out in pursuit of military goals: Richard Haass (Andrea Mitchell Reports)