This is a special issue of Home & Away, one exclusively about Away, inspired by events in Russia. Waiting until Friday seemed a bad idea. So here goes.
There are many more questions than answers when it comes to understanding what transpired over the past 72 hours in Russia—and just as many questions as to what will come next and after next. To channel Donald Rumsfeld, there are a plethora of known and unknown unknowns, including what is in the deal brokered by Belarus and why Prigozhin stopped when the road to Moscow seemed to be open. Nevertheless, here are ten preliminary takeaways:
1. Yes, the events came as a surprise, but there is also the argument they or something like them were inevitable. Putin rules with little legitimacy. He has de-institutionalized Russia and its government. There are no checks, no balances. Putin is something of a warlord. All of which makes it unsurprising that another warlord would ask “Why him and not me?” and challenge him. More surprising is how Putin allowed an alternative to emerge and what this says about his rule.
2. Putin wrapped his initial public remarks (in which he called Prigozhin a traitor) in the events of 1917. It is consistent with his sense of self, that he sees himself not as a latter-day Soviet leader but as a throwback to Russia and the Czars. It is also consistent with how he views the war in Ukraine and this moment in Russian history, as being locked in an existential battle with the West. We will see if any of this resonates internally.
3. The consensus among most Russia experts is that Prigozhin’s challenge has significantly weakened Putin. Maybe. But autocrats tend to stay in power if they keep their nerve and maintain the loyalty of the military and security services. So far at least this appears to be the case. Moscow 2023 is not as yet Tehran 1979.
4. It is not clear what a weaker Putin means in practice, i.e., what would a diminished Putin mean for the day-to-day reality in Russia and the war in Ukraine? It also underestimates what Putin could do to bolster his position. He could provide government handouts to win popular support. He could crack down even more on suspected or potential opponents. He could get the better of Prigozhin in the coming weeks and months. If this were to happen, it could well discourage others from taking Putin on. So I wouldn’t count Putin out quite yet.
5. If Putin does turn out to be demonstrably weaker, it is not necessarily a good thing. It could lead him to escalate in Ukraine just to demonstrate to his own people and the world he is not a pitiful helpless giant.
6. That said, it will be interesting to see if Prigozhin’s blistering critique of the Ukraine war, that it was and is a truly unnecessary war of choice being poorly led for the enrichment of a few, gains traction among the military or public. If it does, it will show that authoritarian systems just as much as democracies need to think twice before launching such interventions. Growing military and popular opposition to the war could persuade Putin to show greater willingness to compromise, as what he cares most about is not Ukraine but himself. I realize this contradicts the previous takeaway, which only underscores how much we do not or cannot yet know.
7. Both Ukraine and the United States could potentially influence Russian decision-making here. Ukraine, as it presses ahead with its counter-offensive, could articulate its willingness to provide special protections to ethnic Russians and to have international monitors in the context of a cease-fire or peace. The United States could make clear it looks forward to the day when Russia could get out from under sanctions and re-integrate in the world and what it would take for this to come about. Both stances could have an impact on opinion inside Russia.
8. China’s reaction to events also has the potential to shape political developments in Russia in the coming weeks. So far, China has publicly stuck by Putin and played down recent events, with its foreign minister welcoming Russia’s deputy foreign minister. Still, Beijing is likely unsettled by how close its most important international partner came to being ousted. It will be interesting to see if China privately urges Putin to find a way out of this war and presses him to pursue a serious diplomatic track. India is another country that has been close to Putin to be watched in this regard.
9. Over the past 16 months much of the American and European foreign policy conversation has focused on how to counter Russian strength or at least aggression. Going forward the conversation needs to be expanded to cover Russian weakness and its potential consequences, including but not limited to the security of nuclear weapons.
10. Decades ago, Paul Kennedy wrote an important book about the rise and fall of great powers. He attributed the latter to imperial overstretch. I would argue that the war Putin launched in Ukraine is a textbook case of such overstretch, one that echoes the Soviet folly in Afghanistan that contributed to the demise of the USSR. History may not repeat itself but it sure can rhyme.
More Friday when the regular Home & Away appears. Have a good week.