Special Edition: A Questionable War of Choice (February 28, 2026)

The United States launched a major armed attack on Iran Saturday, striking military and political targets throughout the country. What follows are a baker’s dozen worth of initial thoughts:

First and foremost, this is a war of choice. The United States had other policy options available. Diplomacy appeared to have promise to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Increased economic pressure had the potential, over time, to precipitate regime change.

Second, this is a preventive, not a preemptive war. Iran posed no imminent threat to vital U.S. interests. Iran was not on the verge of becoming a nuclear weapons state or using what weapons it did have against the United States. At most the threat was a gathering, manageable one.

This distinction is important, as a world in which countries believe they have the right to undertake preventive strikes against those they judge to be threats would be a world of frequent conflict. That is why such actions have no standing under international law.

Third, the Trump administration has chosen an objective – regime change – that is political rather than military. Military force can destroy and kill, but on its own it cannot bring about regime change. What is needed for regime change is a viable alternative and requisite conditions. Sure, it is possible the attack will trigger defections from the political leadership and armed forces of Iran, but this cannot be counted on. Gaza and Hamas constitute a reminder that regimes can absorb incredible punishment, yet hang on to power. Every day that goes by in which the Iranian regime survives will be portrayed by it as a victory.

Fourth, regime ouster is not the same as regime change – certainly not successful regime change. Even if this clerical regime were to fall, the security forces are best positioned to take its place, not a democratic alternative. And they would likely continue Iran’s current foreign policy objectives that the United States finds so objectionable.

Fifth, using military force to kill select leaders as a means of triggering regime change – often termed decapitation – may have occurred but is unlikely to prove decisive in Iran as the leadership has institutionalized itself since taking power nearly fifty years ago. Plus, the leadership has had time to improve succession planning over the past few weeks as the possibility of war increased.

Sixth, the Trump administration called for regime change without preparing the conditions for an alternative to succeed. The political opposition is not united or functioning as a government in-waiting. It is not in a position to accept defections, much less provide security.

Seventh, history suggests that regime change normally requires a physical, on-the-ground presence. This is the lesson of Germany and Japan after World War II, as well as Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan more recently. And even with a ground presence, such efforts often come up short and cost a great deal as both Iraq and Afghanistan underscore. An occupation of Iran is inconceivable given the country’s size and ability to resist.

Eighth, the Trump administration has chosen to accomplish the most ambitious of foreign policy goals with limited means. It rejected a war of choice dedicated to narrower goals, such as degrading known nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, something it appears to have achieved here. If there is a recent parallel to what is taking place in Iran, it is Libya, where just over a decade ago Western forces ousted the leadership using air power but then failed to follow up, leaving the country in chaos.

Ninth, all this comes as a major surprise. This is an administration that has shown no interest in regime change or democracy promotion elsewhere. Nor has it shown an appetite for costly foreign policy ventures, which Trump had promised in his campaign would no longer be a touchstone of U.S. foreign policy. Why here and now is a mystery as there is no clear evidence that the Iranian regime (however unpopular and weakened) is on the edge of collapse.

Tenth, it is quite possible that assembling a massive military presence in the region – what President Trump called an “armada” – after verbal threats failed to persuade the Iranian government to stop killing political opponents subsequently put pressure on the Trump administration to act, as the forces could not be maintained in a high state of readiness on location indefinitely. As a result, the means of policy played a large role in determining the ends of policy, namely, the decision to attack. This is obviously the reverse of how policy should be determined.

Eleventh, the United States has opted yet again to make a massive strategic commitment in the Middle East. This is at odds with the Trump administration’s own National Security Strategy and with the reality that the greatest challenges to U.S. interests are to be found in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Here the parallel is to the 2003 Iraq War, another preventive war of choice in the region that cost the United States enormously. I expect Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are both happy.

Twelfth, the American people are not prepared for this war. Nor is Trump’s political base. War, and especially a prolonged war, will unsettle markets, cause a spike in energy prices, and possibly lead to attacks on American installations and Americans around the world. President Trump did not use his State of the Union speech Tuesday night to make the case for attacking Iran, and much of his statement in the immediate aftermath of Saturday’s attack emphasized past actions by Iran rather than new or emerging threats.

Thirteenth and last, it is possible that last year’s cost-free bombing of three Iranian nuclear sites and the more recent intervention in Venezuela made Trump and those around him highly confident that they could achieve ambitious ends with limited means at a low cost. This is always possible. But history warns that regime change is easier called for than successfully carried out -- and that while it only takes one side to begin a war, it takes two to end it. Iran now has a vote in how big this conflict becomes and how long it endures.

As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.

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Richard Haass in the news

Saturday, February 28: New York Times on Iran.

Saturday, February 28: Katie Couric on Iran.