Special Edition on Iran: Civilization Lives to Fight Another Day (April 8, 2026)

Welcome to yet another special edition of Home & Away, the tenth devoted to Iran since the war began some five weeks ago. I don’t know about you, but I look forward to the day when I can focus the bulk of this newsletter on something else. Alas, that day has yet to arrive…and may not for some time.

The good news is that I am not writing about the death of a civilization or the mass bombing of bridges and power plants in Iran, something that would have constituted a war crime and prompted Iran to retaliate in kind against its neighbors. Instead, I can dwell on the two-week ceasefire announced last night.

The ceasefire was reportedly brought about through the good offices of Pakistan, one of the few countries that maintains good relations with the United States and Iran. Pakistan succeeded as a broker less because of its diplomatic skills than because the protagonists wanted a pause in the fighting to avoid the economic costs of continued or, worse yet, wider conflict. I expect President Trump desperately wanted to avoid the political, military, and economic costs that would have come with more war. Iran, for its part, sought to escape further destruction. China, not wanting a wider war to lead to a global recession or worse, may also have weighed in with Iran.

But to avert the worst is not to achieve the best. As of today, there are more questions than answers. Will the ceasefire come into effect and hold? Will it result in a truly open Strait of Hormuz? Will there be a formal, permanent, and comprehensive peace accord? If so, what will be the provisions, not just regarding the Strait, but also the future of Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile force, its support for proxies, and its calls for sanctions relief and economic compensation? Unless these questions are answered, we could well see a return to war or some messy situation in between, one that constitutes neither peace nor war.

We will know much more over the next couple of weeks, after the conclusion of the initial round of talks, slated to be held in Islamabad. My sense is that we will end up with a new mechanism governing the operation of the Strait that would not constitute a return to the status quo ante. Instead, Iran will end up with a larger role. The principal question will be how limited that role will be and the extent to which it is shared with others in the region and with those dependent on the Strait. An associated question will be the scale of the fee structure, or toll, for use of the Strait and how that money is to be both shared and spent.

The other big question pertains to Iran’s nuclear program. There is an enormous gap between the American call for what is effectively an end to Iran’s nuclear program and what Iran will be prepared to accept. Two outcomes appear possible. The most desirable would be a new negotiated agreement that sets an open-ended ceiling on permitted Iranian activities and establishes a rigorous monitoring and inspections mechanism to ensure the ceiling is being observed. This would require both the United States and Iran to compromise their maximalist demands. Relief from economic sanctions would almost certainly be linked to Iran’s accepting such nuclear constraints and might be an important inducement.

The alternative would be an informal arrangement in which the United States and Israel communicated to Iran what they would be prepared to tolerate regarding its nuclear activities, coupled with warnings of military action if Iran went beyond these limits. The obvious drawbacks of this alternative are two: there would be no on-the-ground inspections, and we could well see intermittent military strikes that could lead to renewed fighting.

It is unclear that a negotiation can be expected to deal explicitly with the future of Iran’s missile and drone programs, nor with Iran’s support for proxies. This is sure to be a major concern for Israel, which will want to retain the right to undertake preventive, preemptive, or retaliatory strikes as it sees fit, a position articulated by Prime Minister Netanyahu shortly after the ceasefire was announced. Fighting in Lebanon is already causing problems for the ceasefire (and the opening of the Strait) and could pose a stumbling block to the signing of any agreement or to its ability to remain in effect over time. Such conditions could also introduce a major source of contention into the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

A final thought. The same pressures and considerations that led to the ceasefire are likely to work against a full-scale renewal of the fighting. No one’s interests would be served by escalation involving U.S. ground forces, attacks on Iranian civilian infrastructure, and/or attacks on the water treatment facilities, refineries, or data centers of neighboring countries. But translating that recognition into a binding, comprehensive, and lasting agreement will prove extraordinarily difficult. The alternative — one already hinted at above — of communicated understandings underpinned by the threatened use of force would make for a considerably darker and more dangerous future for the region.

Welcome to the Sausage Factory

There is an old saw to the effect that watching the legislative or executive branch policymaking process up close is akin to watching sausage being made (i.e., it tends to decrease one’s appreciation of the product). Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan have brought us inside the proverbial sausage factory that was the Trump administration’s making of Iran policy in the run-up to the war. Unsurprisingly, it is not a pretty picture.

Do read the piece in its entirety if you have not already done so. It reflects extraordinary reporting that makes for compelling reading. The article tells the story of Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu coming to Washington in February and making the case to President Trump and a small circle of senior aides for going to war.

Netanyahu played Trump like a fiddle, appealing to his desire to be a historic figure who could do something his predecessors could not — bring down the Iranian regime — while exaggerating what could be accomplished and minimizing the costs and risks. And it worked. Trump quickly signed up for what he came to call an “excursion,” and the pushback from others in the room (other than Vice President J.D. Vance, widely believed to be the principal source of the story for the simple reason that he comes out looking better than anyone else) was minimal. And the rest, as they say, is history.

Here are ten takeaways from someone who has spent more than a little time in the Situation Room and has worked on two previous Middle East wars, the first of which (the 1990 –1991 Gulf War) I supported and the second of which (the 2003 Iraq War) I opposed.

--Assumptions are dangerous when it comes to sound policymaking. In 1990, it was assumed that Saddam Hussein was bluffing and unlikely to invade Kuwait. In 2003, it was assumed that Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors meant Saddam was hiding WMDs, when we later learned he was hiding the fact that he didn’t have them. Here, it was assumed that Iran was ripe for popular uprising and regime change, or that it would not be willing and able to take control of the Strait of Hormuz or lash out effectively against its neighbors. A little “red-teaming” might have gone a long way.

--Regional and functional experts are valuable. In this instance, a lack of Iran experts in the room proved costly. Decapitation (the killing of leaders) was confused with regime change. No one appeared to be aware of the degree to which the regime had institutionalized itself since 1979. There also seemed to be little appreciation of Iran’s capacity for enduring sacrifice. DOGE and the disparagement of public service have taken their toll.

--We are paying a large price for the hollowing out of the NSC staff and for double-hatting the secretary of state as the national security advisor. It would be far better to have a strong NSC staff and leadership that could ensure a degree of rigor in the process and offer independent advice. This is especially important given that the secretary of defense was a cheerleader for military action and so many of the others present appeared reticent, but their concerns were not brought to the fore.

--Israel’s reputation for competence will take a deserved hit. As good as Israel tends to be operationally, it appears to be poor analytically. Netanyahu and Mossad chief David Barnea were either dead wrong in several of their assessments of the prospects for regime change in Iran or they were dishonest in what they put forward in the hope of swaying Trump to sign on to a war they wanted to see fought.

--Trump voiced his views early in the meeting, after hearing the Israeli pitch, which was a mistake, as it discouraged anyone with a contrary view from speaking up. I recall George H.W. Bush not declaring his strongly held views in the early NSC meetings following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, lest he fail to get honest counsel from his senior aides.

--Israel and the U.S.-Israel relationship, already on the defensive because of Gaza, will take a further hit from these revelations. But the lion’s share of the fault lies with the Trump administration, which could and should have pushed back against the many questionable assumptions, as well as the unmade case for acting when it did.

--CIA Director John Ratcliffe appears to have done his job, at one point calling the Israeli predictions of regime change “farcical.” But here, as elsewhere, intelligence assessments are inputs to policy, and in the end the policymakers prevail, even when what they opt for is at odds with the intelligence.

--The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who reportedly believed that going to war was a terrible idea, should have said so. He could have made clear he was offering such a view in his personal capacity rather than in his official capacity as chairman. Here, he was cautious to a fault.

--General Caine was not unique in this regard. Others who harbored doubts, including Chief of Staff Susie Wiles and Marco Rubio, could have asked more questions even if they were not prepared to challenge the emerging consensus. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner had the most experience dealing with Iran, but it is not clear from the article that they weighed in. What you fail to say and do in government can be every bit as consequential as what you do say and do.

--It would not have been easy for contrary views to break through. Trump was clearly on a sugar high after his re-election, the June bombings of Iran, and then the successful operation against Venezuela. This is an administration that operates from the top down rather than the bottom up. It is hard to save a president, particularly this one, from himself.

The Sporting Life

It was a good final weekend of college basketball, and kudos go to both the UCLA women’s team (which demolished South Carolina) and the University of Michigan, which prevailed over Connecticut.

Speaking of South Carolina and UConn, one interesting moment of the weekend was the behavior of Geno Auriemma, the coach of UConn’s women’s team, who manifested a distinct lack of sportsmanship after UConn lost in the semifinals. To his credit, he subsequently apologized: “There’s no excuse for how I handled the end of the game vs. South Carolina. It’s unlike what I do and what our standard is here at Connecticut. I want to apologize to the staff and the team at South Carolina. It was uncalled for in how I reacted. The story should be how well South Carolina played, and I don’t want my actions to detract from that. I’ve had a great relationship with their staff, and I sincerely want to apologize to them.” He could and should have mentioned South Carolina’s coach Dawn Staley by name, but it was a pretty good apology all the same. It is good when the adults in the room act like adults.

I want to end on a high note. It is that time of year again, when our thoughts turn to Augusta and the Masters. I am predicting this is Cam Young’s moment to win his first major. So, mix yourself a mint julep to wash down that pimento cheese sandwich and enjoy.

As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.

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Richard Haass in the news

Sunday, April 5: Fareed Zakaria GPS on Iran.

Monday, April 6: CNBC on Iran.

Tuesday, April 7: Morning Joe on Iran.

Tuesday, April 7: Bloomberg on Iran.

Wednesday, April 8: MS NOW on Iran.