Special Edition on Iran: Going Straight to the Strait (April 27, 2026)

Iran has reportedly proposed to the United States that the two countries focus on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and postpone consideration of Iran’s nuclear program and other issues. The United States should accept this approach and suggest that these negotiations commence as quickly as possible.

Postponing discussion of the nuclear issue makes good sense. There are times when adding issues to a negotiation can create tradeoffs that make agreement less difficult. This is not one of those times. Previous negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have taken years. They are both highly technical and deeply contentious. The gap between the United States and Iran on the basic elements of any accord – what should be done with the nearly one thousand pounds of enriched uranium in Iran; whether Iran should have a right to enrich uranium and, if so, how much and to what level; what, if any, moratorium there should be on future enrichment and how long it should last; and what should be done regarding inspections – precludes any rapid agreement.

The bottom line is clear: To link the opening of the Strait to reaching a mutually acceptable outcome on nuclear issues would risk plunging the world economy into depression. In addition, many would suffer from malnutrition and even die from starvation owing to fertilizer shortages.

That Iran reportedly proposed this “Strait First” formula suggests two things. First, there are likely deep divisions among Iran’s new leaders on nuclear matters. This is hardly surprising. I expect there are those in Iran who have concluded that this war never would have happened if Iran possessed nuclear weapons of its own. They no doubt cite North Korea as a case in point, one that makes the case that nuclear weapons provide a shield that can guarantee regime survival. Ukraine, Libya, and Iraq are just as likely to be cited as examples of what happens when a country gives up the pursuit or the possession of such weapons.

Second, Iran is paying a steep price for the U.S. blockade. Iran cannot export its own oil and gas, thereby depriving the country of its principal sources of revenue and foreign exchange. Iran’s economy was in terrible shape before the war and, more than anything else, it was this reality that brought thousands into the streets to protest the regime. The war made a bad situation worse.

The U.S. blockade of the Strait has compounded Iran’s economic difficulties. The rebuilding of the country – and ultimately the survival of the regime – depends on Iran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz. Denying others access to the Strait does little good if Iran cannot use it either. But to believe that Iran’s economic problems would lead it not only to agree to reopen the Strait but also to capitulate on the nuclear issue would be to continue to misread that country. Eight weeks of war ought to have taught us that Iran is resilient, able to hold out against what it sees as an unacceptable affront to its dignity and threat to its interests.

China also has a large and growing interest in seeing the Strait reopened. China depends not only on Iranian energy but also on that of Iran’s neighbors to fuel its economy. Just as important, Chinese manufacturing relies on affordable and available energy for the materials and components central to its supply chains. The last thing the already struggling Chinese economy needs is a prolonged closure of the Strait. Even worse from its perspective would be a renewed outbreak of hostilities that further damages the energy infrastructure of the region.

The Trump administration should propose a simple deal: The Strait would be reopened as soon as possible, and each side would drop its blockade. The U.S. blockade was never meant to be an end in itself but rather a means to an end. That opportunity now presents itself.

The thorniest issue may be Iran’s ability to charge transit fees for tankers and cargo ships. Here, the United States could agree in principle, provided that any fees are not excessive, that other littoral countries share in the proceeds, and that Iran accepts that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway. A new governing mechanism for the Strait could be established to deal with these issues as well as traffic control, de-mining, oil spills, and future incidents. The Europeans could (and should) be taken up on their offer to provide security for commercial vessels using the Strait. This is all admittedly less than ideal, but a return to the status quo ante is not in the cards. All wars have consequences, and this one is no exception.

I would suggest that any easing of economic sanctions targeting Iran, or any return of frozen Iranian assets, be saved for nuclear negotiations. Iran will already derive enormous economic benefit from a reopening of the Strait, and economic inducements are almost certain to be needed as part of a nuclear accord.

One final point. The decision to delink the Strait from other issues requires that there be an informal arrangement on those other issues. Iran should understand that the United States and Israel would not sit idly by if they observed that Iran was moving to alter the status of its nuclear program and advance closer to producing a nuclear weapon. A “Strait First” approach to diplomacy does not and should not mean a Strait-only policy.

As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.

---

Richard Haass in the news

Sunday, April 26: This Week with George Stephanopoulos on Iran War.