Special Edition: Retaliation (January 29, 2024)
This weekend’s attack on a U.S. military facility near the Jordanian–Syrian border crossed at least two lines previous attacks had not. First, it resulted in the deaths of three American servicemen and injuries to some three dozen more. And second, the armed drone targeted U.S. troops in Jordan rather than Iraq or Syria, signifying a widening of the battlefield and a willingness to take on a moderate Sunni Arab country closely aligned with the United States.
Even though the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed responsibility for the attack, U.S. government officials have said it appears the drone was launched from Syria, by one of the many radical militias that operate there and are supplied and trained by Iran, the same country that also backs Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other militias in the region. We still don’t know Iran’s involvement in the attack itself, i.e., whether it ordered, approved, or in any way facilitated it by providing targeting information. Predictably, Iran is publicly denying any connection to the assault.
It is possible the attack was motivated by the war in Gaza and intended to raise the cost of the United States’ support for Israel, but this seems unlikely, or at most peripheral. It is more probable that the attack was part of a larger and longer-term effort that predates the war in Gaza, one designed to drive the United States, and what are often described as its “occupation forces,” out of Iraq and Syria, thereby clearing the way for greater Iran influence over these countries and the entire Middle East.
The immediate question is whether and how the United States ought to respond. Sunday’s White House statement indicated that there would be some retaliation, that, “we will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner our choosing.”
Already, voices are calling for retaliatory measures that would take the fight directly to Iranian soil, “going to the source,” to use a phrase often invoked by Secretary of State Al Haig more than forty years ago. This seems premature, at least until we have more intelligence as to its role, since it is quite possible Iran did not order this strike. While this attack was unique in that it killed American service members, their deaths have a great deal to do with the fact that the base’s air defenses were inadequate, something that would have been hard for Iran to predict. Attacking Iran would also risk triggering a larger war at a time the United States is already stretched thin with providing arms to Israel, aiding Ukraine, and bolstering its ability to deter any Chinese move against Taiwan. There are also renewed concerns that North Korea might be contemplating aggressive action.
The entire logic of U.S. national security policy for a decade now has been to reduce its focus on the greater Middle East (above all Iraq and Afghanistan) so that it could pivot, i.e., prioritize the Asia-Pacific and China. This reorientation was somewhat diluted by the need to respond to Russian aggression against Ukraine, but the logic still largely holds.
My advice would be to attack sites in Syria associated with the group that carried out this attack. That said, we would be unlikely to deal it a decisive blow as such groups are determined and present poor targets. Nor would retaliatory strikes prevent future attacks as militias of this sort usually maintain access to lethal technology. But responding this way would still weaken the group and communicate that those who attack U.S. forces put themselves at risk. A variant would be to include Iranian (IRGC) forces in Syria in any set of retaliatory actions.
Any such retaliation should be accompanied with a warning to Iran that the United States will respond against Iran itself if there is a future attack by any of its proxies that causes U.S. casualties. Such a response could involve attacking Iranian shipping, industrial sites where armaments used by militias are made, and/or sites of economic and/or military importance to Iran. The Iranian regime, already strapped economically and embroiled in a succession crisis, may do more to rein in its proxies rather than risk such an American response. Such a reaction by Iranian authorities would reduce the risk to U.S. forces and that of a wider conflict.
One final point. Once the dust settles, the Biden administration should take a fresh look at its force posture in the region and weigh whether the benefits of its presence justify the risks as well as the opportunity cost worldwide. It may be that the presence makes sense, but this should be assessed, not assumed.