Special Edition: Two Years After October 7, Progress is Finally at Hand (October 6, 2025)
Welcome to this special edition of Home & Away. It comes two years after the horrific terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023, in which more than 1,200 Israelis and others were brutally murdered and 251 were taken hostage.
The attacks set in motion events that have transformed the Middle East. Iran, the principal benefactor of Hamas, finds itself in a much-diminished position strategically, militarily, and economically. Its nuclear program was set back years as a result of Israeli and American armed strikes. Syria’s Assad regime, heavily backed by Iran, is no longer, while Iran’s proxy Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self.
Hamas itself is dramatically weakened militarily; it has lost upwards of twenty thousand fighters. It is no longer an organized fighting force in a position to mount operations anywhere near the scale of October 7. Its popularity also appears to be down as many in Gaza blame Hamas in no small part for the destruction and misery there.
In short, Israel’s military position is arguably as good as it has ever been. The same cannot be said about where it finds itself politically. The country is deeply divided, with many Israelis blaming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government for the fact that the hostages remain in captivity. Meanwhile, the psychological and physical toll of continued war on Israeli troops continues to mount. Beyond its borders, Israel has forfeited the initial wave of sympathy that came its way after October 7 and now is something of an international pariah. Support for Israel in the West, including in the United States and even among American Jewry, is much reduced.
Curiously, this anniversary comes at a time when diplomatic prospects are considerably brighter than they have been at any point over the past two years. Let me be more precise: brighter for a breakthrough, not for peace. I would think the odds are at least even if not better for a deal to emerge over coming days or weeks that would include a ceasefire, a hostages-for-prisoners swap, and a partial Israeli military pullback. It is also possible to imagine more aid flowing into Gaza and the formation of a council of Palestinian technocrats and international experts (under the supervision of a board chaired by President Trump and including former UK prime minister Tony Blair) to temporarily oversee Gaza.
Why now? As noted, there is considerable pressure inside Israel to get the hostages back. Netanyahu has less reason to fear his fragile coalition government falling over right-wing dissatisfaction with any compromise deal, as elections must take place over the next year regardless of the outcome of these negotiations.
Hamas also feels pressure to compromise. Gazans have grown weary of paying the price of October 7. Trump would almost certainly give Israel a green light to resume military operations if Hamas turned down what is being proposed. And Hamas’s Arab backers seem keen to wind the war down. Qatar, in particular, did not appreciate being the target of Israeli strikes aimed at Hamas leaders.
Another and possibly most important factor explaining why now is ripe for a breakthrough is Donald Trump. The American president wants to be seen as a peacemaker, and it is increasingly apparent he will not be able to earn this accolade by ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict. I expect he is also tired of hearing from his friends in the Arab world that the continuing war is making him and the United States look bad.
For Netanyahu, this outcome would be a climbdown. He will not achieve his goal of eliminating Hamas. But Bibi has little choice. He can’t afford a public split with the president of the United States, who is more popular in Israel than Netanyahu himself and who can raise tariffs or cut aid if he so chooses. Bibi could do an end run around Joe Biden, but the Republicans will back Trump rather than him if it comes to that. In short, Bibi may well be trapped unless Hamas decides to let him off the hook by effectively rejecting the deal at hand.
Netanyahu has only himself to blame for the situation that Israel finds itself in. He is paying a price for having overreached militarily, both in Gaza and with his attack on Qatar. He has as well under-reached politically, refusing to put on the table any meaningful day after plan for addressing Palestinian political aspirations. In the process, he has squandered the chance to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, the most important country in the Arab and Islamic worlds. And he had to accept terms that rule out annexation and the forced transfer of Palestinians out of Gaza. Still, he will likely do his best to spin it all as a victory and may well succeed in getting re-elected whenever elections are held in 2026.
It is important to underscore that, even under the most optimistic scenario, we will not be looking at peace. It will be extremely hard to move beyond a limited deal. For starters, Hamas has not accepted that it must disarm, and even if it did, there is no way to monitor or verify the handing over (what in Norther Ireland was termed “decommissioning”) of its weapons. Hamas can be denied a formal role in Palestinian governance but it will still have influence, possibly more than any other actor. Moreover, Palestinian leadership otherwise remains weak, while Israel is a country not ready to make meaningful concessions for peace no matter who is in charge. This is a situation decidedly unripe for ambitious diplomacy.
This is not reason for despair. In any negotiation there is a choice between a comprehensive plan and something less. The former is obviously more desirable but much more difficult to bring about. I was the U.S. envoy for the Cyprus negotiations in the 1980s, and we regularly toggled between trying to solve the island’s division and something more modest, what we termed a “mini-package.” Such agreements can be less difficult to bring about, are valuable in their own right, and can pave the way to something larger. This is precisely where we stand in the Middle East. The president is right to press both sides to take yes for an answer. To be sure, this means they will all live to fight another day. That may not be peace, but it is preferable to them fighting today.
As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.
Richard Haass in the news
Monday, September 29: The Hill on Military Leaders Meeting.
Tuesday, September 30: Wealth Actually on U.S. Foreign Policy.
Wednesday, October 1: WBUR on Tony Blair and Postwar Gaza.
Thursday, October 2: Park Avenue Synagogue on America at 250.
Monday, October 6: MSNBC Morning Joe on Gaza Peace Talks.


Thank you Richard for that clear and accurate analysis of the Israel-Gaza conflict.
Israel's demographic engineering has left an ostensible scar on the population in Gaza & West Bank. It has alianated the country from thre Arab-Muslim world & brought Iran closer to all gulf states, including Turkiye, on matters of regional security & cooperation. Needless to say this has alianated Israel from such cooperation in the Future.
At this juncture it is in the interest of both parties to de-escalate as Israel cannot fight a war with the whole Arab-Muslims & the whole Arab-Muslim world would not appreciate a nuclear strike to anyone of its members. It is impirtant to metion that US wants to keep good relations with all Gulf states & especially Qatar which adds to the calculous & compounds more weight towards a peace agreemnt in the Middle East.
Trump has recently announced that an attack on Qatar will be considered an attack on the US, which limits the possibility of a wider regional war and Ben Nitay's plans or options for defeating all of Hamas, which by the way where part Nitay's plan to eliminate the pissibility of a two state solution! Meaning Israel has brought up or allowed Hamas to grow as counterweight to a strong Palestinian authority in West Bank & GAZA.
At this juncture, Israel shares the responsibility of the events that took place in Gaza two years ago & is time the country to follow an International plan for peaceful transition to a two-state solution in the region. The challanges are who will determine the boundaries of the two states, the extent of International support to monitor, suppirt & rebuild Gaza. Itbis best to remain under international supervisio for at least 7 years to ease the tension & help develop a capable economic force in Palestine, as well as to help protect the population from further military strikes on behalf of Israel.