Strait is the Gate (June 26, 2026)

Welcome to Home & Away. It has been an eventful week by any measure, as even this partial list underscores:

· Elon Musk became the world’s first ex-trillionaire;

· Regime Change, the insider account of the second Trump administration, hit the shelves;

· Pete Hegseth continued to give Xi Jinping a run for his money when it comes to purging military officers, in the process threatening the professionalism and excellence of the U.S. military;

· Donald Trump gave more attention to the Reflecting Pool than the Strait of Hormuz;

· Alan Greenspan passed away at 100 after an extraordinary life characterized by public service and intellectual honesty;

· The people and government of Venezuela, as if they didn’t have enough on their plates, now have to rebuild after back-to-back 7+ magnitude earthquakes;

· Ukraine continued to take the war to Russia, which may soon be tempted to pressure Europe and the United States to rethink their support for Ukraine by widening the war through an attack on NATO;

· Speaking of which, Europe (especially France) is suffering from an unprecedented heat wave. Two headlines I’d like to see: “French Toast” and “Is Paris Burning?”

· And finally, a listless U.S. Open is now in the books, won by the unpopular Wyndham Clark and even more by a course where only three golfers broke par.

The War to End All Wars

Much of what I’ve said about Iran in recent weeks still holds: The U.S.-Iran MOU falls far short of accomplishing the goals articulated by the Trump administration at the war’s outset. It is extraordinarily generous toward Iran, paving the way for Iran to establish a powerful role for itself in the region. And the MOU guarantees that there will be friction, or worse, between Iran, the United States, and Israel (and between the U.S. and Israel) over Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s conventional military rearmament and support for proxies, and the status of the Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking of which, Iran asserted its ability to continue to control shipping through the Strait of Hormuz by attacking a cargo ship that was using a route off the coast of Oman that Iranian authorities had not approved. Such Iranian control of the Strait was all but assured by an MOU that gives it the ability (in tandem with Oman) to oversee use of the Strait and to impose (after sixty days) what are effectively transit fees. Iran could attack the ship with impunity, confident that Trump and the United States were too committed to making the case publicly that the war was over and won to renew confrontation.

This all provides a glimpse of the future of that region. Indeed, four months on, it remains clear that this was an unnecessary war of choice that left the United States, its Gulf partners, and Israel decidedly worse off. The war has also revived a near-moribund Iran, which just a year ago was reeling from U.S. and Israeli attacks on its nuclear sites, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the Israeli defanging of both Hamas and Hezbollah, and the cumulative, crushing effects of economic sanctions and economic mismanagement. History will be deservedly brutal in its judgment about the Israeli and American decision to go to war.

You can go deeper on all this if you choose to listen to the most recent episode of Alternate Shots, the podcast I do regularly with my buddy John Ellis.

End Zones

Here at Home, I want to discuss some political matters, beginning in New York City. The growing power of the far left in the city and Albany bodes ill for both. The interest in increasing taxes will push wealthy individuals and corporations away from New York and toward cities like Miami, Dallas, and Nashville. Decidedly absent from New York’s progressive agenda is any interest in cutting spending even where it is apparent that funds are not being spent wisely or effectively. It is a question of when, not if, this city faces its most severe financial crisis in half a century.

Three of the congressional races and many more state assembly primaries were won by far-left progressives who, in quite a few cases, are members of the Democratic Socialists of America. They are anti-police, anti-prison, anti-defense, anti-business, and anti-Israel—and in favor of raising taxes to penalize the wealthy as well as pay for a higher minimum wage and a much-expanded government-funded safety net.

The risk for Democrats nationally is that these individuals and the forces they represent will pull the party far to the left as we close in on 2028, losing much of the country in the process. The risk for the rest of us is that they gain control of the party, either making it easier for an unreformed Republican Party to retain power or to come to power themselves.

What we are seeing is something of a mirror image of what has happened in the Republican Party and MAGA. Once again, relatively small numbers of ideological voters are prevailing in closed, single-party primaries. The result is that American politics are increasingly defined by parties dominated by highly motivated individuals occupying the end zones of American politics. The middle of the field is all but abandoned, which leads to gridlock at the national level or one-party rule. What it certainly does not lead to is compromise, checks and balances, and the sort of centrist policy that has served this country well.

Arms and the Man

I published an article on China and Taiwan this week – “China Could Win Taiwan Without Fighting: The Costs of Trump’s Equivocation” – in Foreign Affairs. It is coauthored with David Sacks — not the crypto David Sacks, but the David Sacks who is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and who has a splendid biography of Hans Morgenthau coming out in November.

We argue that Xi Jinping has made gaining control of Taiwan a major priority and is driven to accomplish something that eluded all of his predecessors. But although Xi has instructed his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, his preference is to acquire the island without firing a shot. Going to war, even against a weaker foe, is always hazardous, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ military campaign against Iran make clear. If Xi invaded Taiwan and ended up in a protracted conflict, he would risk his power and legitimacy. And Xi knows that using force against Taiwan would come at the expense of economic development because the United States and its allies would, at the very minimum, respond by cutting China off from advanced technology and imposing crippling economic and financial sanctions.

Xi seems to have concluded that the surest path to securing control of Taiwan without a war runs through Donald Trump, who has frequently criticized Taiwan and questioned the wisdom of defending the island. Xi’s influence was apparent in the days after the May summit, as Trump borrowed rhetoric from Beijing in statements about Taiwanese domestic politics and paused a pending arms sale to Taipei. Trump then repeated his claim that Taiwan stole the U.S. chip industry and said he did not want the United States to fight a war over Taiwan 9,500 miles away. His administration got the message. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth subsequently failed to mention Taiwan in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the first time a U.S. defense secretary had omitted Taiwan from such a speech in a decade.

What is motivating Trump’s comments and his dismissal of decades of U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is unclear. It might be a belief that this is the best path to de-escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait and avoid armed conflict. It could also reflect a conclusion that reducing support for Taiwan is a price worth paying for improved commercial access to China or a broader détente with Beijing.

The objective of China’s leader is far clearer. Xi is seeking to redefine what is considered normal in the United States’ approach to Taiwan. If China can bring about changes in U.S. policy that strengthen doubts regarding Washington’s reliability, doubts that have already gained ground because of the Trump administration’s general skepticism toward allies, many in Taiwan may conclude that they have no choice but to seek an accommodation on Beijing’s terms. Such a development would raise alarm throughout the region. U.S. allies would come to question the wisdom of putting their security in Washington’s hands, leading to a decisive shift in the balance of power in Beijing’s favor.

American policymakers should recognize China’s strategy for what it is and stop giving ground on U.S. commitments to Taiwan. The first task should be to approve the pending arms package for Taiwan. Xi may respond by canceling his September visit to Washington, but that would be a price well worth paying if he comes away understanding that Taiwan is not his for the taking. You can find a gift link to the full piece here.

One more thing on this. You might want to read our piece in conjunction with another by Dennis Blair, who argues that those who suggest Taiwan cannot be defended are flat-out wrong. He notes that in sophisticated, classified war games conducted by the Defense Department, “China was consistently thwarted in achieving its objective of conquering the island.” This makes it imperative, as we argue in our article, that arms sales to Taiwan go ahead so that Xi’s strategy of separating us from Taiwan and undermining Taiwan’s confidence does not succeed. Admiral Blair has more than a little standing here: he headed our Pacific Command from 1999-2002 and years later was Director of National Intelligence back when it was a job for serious, qualified people.

Just Sayin’

I also published a piece on the eve of a special gathering – a consistory – of Cardinals in Rome convened by Pope Leo XIV. One of the four scheduled sessions will be devoted to the “just war” doctrine.

Pope Leo appears to be seeking to limit the scope of just war to self-defense, such as the war Ukraine is fighting against Russia. I expect he has been heavily influenced by recent history. The 2003 US-led war against Iraq, Hamas’s October 2023 attack on Israel, elements of Israel’s response in Gaza and Lebanon, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the US-Israeli war against Iran were all wars of choice that would not be considered “just” in design, execution, or both.

To be just, a war must be fought for a worthy cause, judged as likely to succeed, authorized by a legitimate authority, and undertaken only as a last resort. Just wars must be conducted in a manner that uses no more military force than is necessary (the proportionality standard) and respects the safety of noncombatants.

This guidance is meant to influence the thinking of the 1.4 billion Catholics around the world, individuals and leaders alike. But it is also meant to influence policy and policy debates more broadly.

It turns out that determining what should constitute a just war is easier said than done. What makes for a worthy cause? How much risk should a country take in not resorting to force if the penalty for being wrong could mean thousands of its own citizens being killed? At what point does stopping repression of a population (not to mention genocide) justify the proper use of military force? When does inaction become unjust?

Then there is the question of what constitutes a legitimate authority. Russia and China, for example, blocked UN condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Does that make Ukraine’s defense unjust?

Meanwhile, any leader about to initiate a war expects success. But wars are inherently uncertain, which makes this long-standing requirement close to meaningless.

Questions about how force should be used are equally complex. Just war theory emphasizes not attacking civilians. But what is to be done when countries or non-state actors (such as Hamas in Gaza) hide fighters and weapons in schools or hospitals?

With war becoming more frequent and more lethal to civilians, it is understandable that Leo and the Cardinals are wading into the debate over its legitimacy. They will be frustrated, though, if they rely on the Church’s traditional criteria for useful guidance. The best outcome of the consistory would be to authorize an overhaul of the just war doctrine for the modern era—and to ask the necessary questions.

Here’s a link to the full text of “Questioning the Just War Doctrine” as it appeared in Project Syndicate.

More Perfect

As if I haven’t inundated you enough, I also wrote a piece on democracy, “10 Things You Can Do to Improve Our Country,” for The Preamble on Substack. As you might expect from the author of The Bill of Obligations, the essay argues that rights alone do not a democracy make. Yes, we have traditionally understood that the process of making America “more perfect” (to borrow the line from the Constitution) meant increasing access to rights and expanding those rights. But as important as this is, it is not enough.

For a democracy to function, rights must be complemented by obligations: obligations of one citizen to another, obligations of all citizens to their government and country. Why? Rights inevitably come into conflict, and when they do, there must be a way of sorting through competing claims. At a minimum, a commitment to staying open to compromise, remaining civil, and rejecting violence can be prerequisites to bridging inevitable differences over rights and the policies meant to protect and promote them.

All of which brings us to the 250th anniversary of this great experiment we call America. The founders of our democracy had a good deal to say about rights and little to say about obligations. But that may have been because rights were often ignored at the time of this country’s birth, and obligations could be assumed given the collective struggle for rights.

This is no longer the case. Yes, this is a time of celebration, but it should also be one of rededication, to embrace our obligations along with our calls for rights. Democracy is too valuable and fragile to be taken for granted. To be sure, it is demanding of its citizens. The good news is that it rewards them if they preserve and protect it. Here is the full text of the piece. Happy almost July 4.

As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.

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Richard Haass in the news

Friday, June 19: Project Syndicate on the Just War Doctrine.

Monday, June 22: MS NOW on Iran Talks.

Monday, June 22: Foreign Affairs on China and Taiwan.

Wednesday, June 24: The Preamble on Improving America’s Democracy.