Welcome to Home & Away. You will be relieved to know I have nothing to say (yet) about the trial taking place a few miles south of where I am writing, one involving a certain ex-president. I will also hold off reacting to the polls, which continue to suggest that six months ahead of the election Donald Trump is ahead in all but one of the half-dozen or so states that remain up for grabs. And I will only have something to say about the two presidential debates now scheduled for June and September closer to those dates, i.e., only when we are confident they will actually occur. All of which is to say that I will focus for now on other things, beginning with Ukraine.
The Forgotten War
I want to start with Ukraine as it has become something of a forgotten war as public attention in this country has turned to the Middle East or things domestic. But we neglect it at our peril given the stakes. It is critical, for security in Europe and also elsewhere, that Russia not succeed in eradicating Ukraine as a sovereign, independent country.
For the past few months, the biggest danger was our doing too little, of what might be described as foreign policy underreach. Fortunately, Speaker of the House Mike Johnson had a change of heart and the military aid spigot has been reopened. But no one should assume that opposition to supporting Ukraine will not reappear. Isolationism may have in this one instance been defeated, but it has not been eliminated.
The bigger problem now might instead be just the opposite, foreign policy overreach, of setting overly-ambitious goals for Ukraine. We need to be honest as to what Ukraine can realistically accomplish on the battlefield given disparities between what it can field compared with Russia, demands on our military resources in other parts of the world, and sharp limits on the West’s ability to produce equipment and ammunition. I recognize this argument may be unfashionable, but it needs to be made all the same. What follows is the article I published Wednesday in Project Syndicate.
Three months ago, I wrote a column titled Will Ukraine Survive? The answer (thankfully) for the next year appears to be “yes,” owing to Ukraine’s willingness to fight and sacrifice and the resumption of substantial U.S. military aid.
At the same time, Russia has launched a new offensive in the northeast that threatens Kharkiv (Ukraine’s second-largest city), is girding for a protracted war, and has largely reconstituted its forces. This raises an important question: With the new tranche of aid in hand, what should Ukraine and its backers in the West seek to achieve? What should constitute success?
Some answer that success should be defined as Ukraine recovering all of its lost territory, to re-establish its 1991 borders. U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has expressed the view that 2025 could be the time for Ukraine to once again mount a counter-offensive against Russian troops.
This would be a serious mistake. Don’t get me wrong: re-establishing rightful, legal borders would be highly desirable, demonstrating that aggression is not acceptable. But foreign policy must be doable as well as desirable, and Ukraine simply is not in a position to liberate Crimea and its eastern regions through military force.
The math is unavoidable. Russia has too many soldiers and a wartime economy capable of producing large amounts of arms and ammunition. Despite sanctions, Russia has been able to ramp up its military-industrial base and has access to weaponry and ammunition produced in Iran and North Korea and to Chinese manufactured goods and technologies that contribute to the Kremlin’s war effort.
Another factor militating against a Ukraine effort to recapture its lands by force is that offensive operations tend to require much more in the way of manpower, equipment, and ammunition than do defensive efforts. This is especially so when defenses have had the chance to build fortifications, as Russia has in much of the Ukrainian territory it occupies.
The likely result of Ukraine returning to the offensive would be a massive loss of soldiers, something the already short-handed Ukrainian military can ill afford. The limited military equipment and ammunition Ukraine has access to would be quickly depleted, in the process making it more difficult to defend areas currently under Ukraine’s control. A failed Ukrainian offensive would also give new talking points to those in Western capitals skeptical of providing any assistance to Ukraine, viewing such aid as wasteful.
What strategy, then, should Ukraine and its supporters pursue? First, Ukraine should emphasize the defensive, an approach that would allow it to husband its limited resources and frustrate Russia.
Second, Ukraine should be given the means (long-range strike capabilities) and the freedom to attack Russian forces anywhere in Ukraine, as well as Russian warships in the Black Sea and economic targets within Russia itself. Russia must come to feel the cost of a war it initiated and prolongs.
Third, Ukraine’s backers must commit to providing long-term military aid. The goal of all of the above is to signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that time is not on Russia’s side and that he cannot hope to outlast Ukraine.
Ukraine and its supporters should do one more thing: propose an interim cease-fire agreement along existing lines.
Putin will likely reject such a proposal, but his doing so should make it less difficult to win debates in the United States over providing assistance to Ukraine, as it will expose Russia as the party responsible for the continuation of the war. It might even provide a context in which U.S. military aid to Ukraine would continue should Donald Trump retake the presidency in November.
This combination of a shift to defense, deep strikes, continued Western military assistance, and a diplomatic effort that exposes Russia for the aggressor that it is, might over time persuade Putin to accept an interim ceasefire. Under such an agreement, neither country would be asked to give up its long-term claims.
Ukraine could continue to seek the return of all its territory; Russia could continue to claim Ukraine has no right to exist as a sovereign state. Both sides could continue to rearm. Sanctions could remain in place. Ukraine could explore closer connections to both the European Union and NATO.
Ukraine would no doubt resist elements of this approach. But the U.S. and Ukraine’s other supporters should insist on it. Ukraine cannot demand unconditional support any more than any other strategic partner. A renewed counter-offensive would fail while undermining Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. What Ukraine would gain from an interim ceasefire is an opportunity to begin rebuilding the country, as money and investment will not become available so long as the country remains an active war zone.
An interim ceasefire almost certainly would not lead to anything resembling peace, which will likely have to wait for the arrival of a Russian leadership that chooses to end the country’s pariah status. That might not happen for years or decades. In the meantime, though, Ukraine would be much better off than it would be if the war continued.
Such arrangements – non-permanent, less than formal peace – have worked well in other contexts, including on the Korean Peninsula and in Cyprus. They do not represent solutions, but they are preferable to the alternatives. And even if Russia rejects any ceasefire, as could well prove to be the case, Ukraine would be better off with a military and diplomatic strategy that protects the country’s core, preserves its independence, and maintains external support. Ukraine’s friends ought to keep this in mind before they define success in a manner that sets the country up to fail.
After has Arrived
What is to come after major military operations subside in Gaza, the subject of much of what I wrote about last week, is finally taking center stage in Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to budge from his strategy of first trying to inflict a decisive military defeat on Hamas and only then turning to who or what (other than the Palestinian Authority, which he has ruled out) would replace Hamas in Gaza. This among things explains his determination to proceed with the assault on Rafah over U.S. and international objections.
My own view is that such an approach is bound to fail, as there is no way to eliminate Hamas militarily. Thousands of fighters will survive Israeli attacks and then re-emerge to challenge any force aiming to take the place of Hamas. The only way to avoid a choice between Hamas or Israeli occupation, the only way to achieve success, is to create conditions under which a capable Arab force, prepared to stay for years, absorb casualties, and take on Hamas as required, can be constituted. This will require the involvement of Egypt and other Arab governments, the Palestinian Authority, and the United States, and will also require the introduction of a political process that begins to address the end of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and what would take its place.
What is noteworthy is that it is not just folks such as yours truly pointing this out but also Yoav Gallant, Israel’s Minister of Defense. Parts of Gallant’s May 15 speech are well worth quoting:
As long as Hamas retains control over civilian life in Gaza, it may rebuild and strengthen, thus requiring the IDF to return and fight in areas where it has already operated. We must dismantle Hamas’ governing capabilities in Gaza.
The key to this goal is military action, and the establishment of a governing alternative in Gaza. In the absence of such an alternative, only two negative options remain: Hamas’s rule in Gaza or Israeli military rule in Gaza. The meaning of indecision is choosing one of the negative options. It would erode our military achievements, lessen the pressure on Hamas, and sabotage the chances of achieving a framework for the release of hostages.
The end of the military campaign must come together with political action. The “day after Hamas” will only be achieved with Palestinian entities taking control of Gaza, accompanied by international actors, establishing a governing alternative to Hamas’s rule. I must reiterate: I will not agree to the establishment of Israeli military rule in Gaza. Israel must not establish civilian rule in Gaza.
I don’t know how to say “throw down the gauntlet” in Hebrew, but Gallant has done just that. Which presents Netanyahu with a dilemma: How does he meet the requirements of Gallant and those who agree with him without losing the support of his ultra-right coalition partners who reject any opening to the Palestinians and are already calling for Gallant to be fired. Netanyahu is a political survivor whose survival skills are about to be tested.
Strategic Bromance
This week saw the latest installment in the growing relationship between Xi Jinping’s China and Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Despite U.S. warnings about the consequences of continuing to support Russia’s war effort, China appears to be undeterred and will continue to provide Russia with the means to produce military equipment it can bring to bear in its war against Ukraine.
Xi’s decision to side with Russia in its war against Ukraine is not cost-free, as it has alienated nearly all of Western Europe, which is in turn adopting a much firmer line on China. But his decision to push ahead in spite of the consequences – Europe is a far more important economic partner for China than Russia – could reflect his strategic assessment that China benefits from Russia prevailing while the West depletes itself supporting Ukraine militarily and economically—or it may reflect his assessment there is no upside for him with the United States if he shows any restraint. Or both.
What is certain is that the United States this week introduced new tariffs against China, targeting some $18 billion of Chinese exports of electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, solar cells, and more. The decision tells us several things. The U.S. will not sit idly by as China seeks to return to an export-led growth model, subsidizes critical exports, and squeezes out international competition through its artificially cheap goods. It also underscores that the area of U.S.-China trade affected by export controls and tariffs is growing. (In the parlance of the Biden administration, the size of the yard is expanding.)
It suggests too that increasing economic confrontation with China is one of the few issues on which there is bipartisan agreement. The era of engagement for engagement’s sake, either because it was thought it would lead to liberalization within China, greater restraint in Chinese foreign policy, or both, is over. The result is a relationship increasingly lacking any positive rationale other than the avoidance of crisis and conflict. This is hardly an inspiring definition of success, but it does beat failure.
Weekend
I have been advised by several readers to end on a lighter note. I don’t do lightness all that well but will try. Tonight is the chance for my battered, depleted, but big-hearted Knicks to close out Indiana. The only problem is that if they do (or if they fail to do it tonight but win Sunday) their reward for success will be the Celtics, who hold the best regular season record in the NBA’s Eastern conference.
Plus, there is golf—the PGA Championship, one of the four majors, being played in Kentucky at Valhalla. It is hard to bet against Scottie Scheffler nowadays, who did not skip a beat, holing out from the fairway for an eagle on his first hole of the tournament. Xander Schauffele is off to a strong start; the question with him is whether he finishes strong. And then there’s Rory McIlroy, who has been playing great golf of late. The big question I am sure you are all pondering is whether Rory’s just announced divorce will motivate or distract him. We’ll know that and more by Sunday evening.
As always, some links to click on. And feel free to share Home & Away.
Richard Haass in the news
Thursday, May 16: CNBC Squawkbox
Check out The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens